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Islamic International Law and Public
International Law: Separate
Expressions of World Order
DAVID A. WESTBROOK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Writing at the end of the thirteenth century, the Christian prince
Don Juan Manuel distinguished cold wars from hot wars.' Cold
wars do not involve open hostilities and are not resolved by treaties.
During the prosecution of a hot war, however, society is defined by
violence, the vital line between friend and foe. At the end of a hot
war, the bounds of the polity are defined by treaty. Hot wars are
thus both more visceral and more definite than cold wars. Even a
cold war, however, divides "us" from "them," mainly by reference
to expected violence. By dividing peoples, the prospective violence
of a cold war fulfills the same political function as the actual vio-
lence of a hot war, albeit far less dramatically. Cold war societies
relate to one another in terms of allegiance, and understand them-
selves in contrast to prospective enemies. Islam expresses this divi-
sion between friend and foe, and its political results, by dividing the
world into the dar al-harb-the domain of war-and the dar al-
islam-the domain of Islam, where war is forbidden. The actual
* Ford Fellow in Public International Law, Harvard Law School; Chercheur Libre,
D~partement de Droit International, Universit6 Catholique de Louvain. This Article could
not have been written without the help of Harvard Law School Professor Frank Vogel. I
have relied on his scholarly work, and he has graciously reviewed my many drafts,
providing invaluable editorial advice. Of course, I alone am responsible for the radical
simplifications employed and for any mistakes that may remain.
1. Don Juan Manuel actually refers to cold war as "lukewarm war." See Don Juan
Manuel, Libro de los Estados at xxvii (R.B. Tate & I.R. Macpherson eds., 1974).
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presence of violence is not dispositive: it is the possibility of vio-
lence, and the formation of identity in response to that possibility,
that informs the world of politics.
Don Juan Manuel had the Spanish Muslims-the "Moors"-in
mind when he thought about "them," the other that defined his
society and gave Christian Spain a sense of purpose. For the last
century, we in the liberal West have had a similar purpose and a
similar identity. We have defined ourselves simply and militarily as
the enemies of an array of avowedly non-liberal states, chiefly the
Soviet Union and Germany.2 In the last few years, such conflict
has ceased to be available to us. The poet Cavafy told us that we
need our barbarians, real or imagined. "Those people were a kind
of solution."3 Now, for the liberal Western intellectuals who have
worked to build public international law, "those people" are gone.
The "triumph" of the liberal West over the Marxist East has
brought confusion, a sense of aimlessness, and introspection.4 With
the end of the Cold War, the aims and significance of public inter-
national law have become unclear. In the hope that international
law can be established on a self-sufficient foundation, many publi-
cists are turning to Kant and other luminaries of the liberal tradi-
tion, thinkers whose work has for too long been the stuff of cursory
footnotes. While reexamining the philosophical foundations of our
legal tradition can certainly be fruitful, we may also learn about our
commitments, and thereby articulate our identity, by comparing
our legal culture with another.
It can be argued that Islam provides the sole coherent, non-lib-
2. When we defined ourselves in terms of communism, the differences between Islam
and the West seemed less significant. U.S. Supreme Court Justice and U.S. Chief of
Counsel at Nuremburg Robert H. Jackson provides a striking example: "Today the anxious
countries of the West find in the Islamic world some of their most bold and
uncompromising allies in resisting the drive for world supremacy by those whose Prophet is
Marx." Robert H. Jackson, Foreword to 1 Law in the Middle East: Origin and
Development of Islamic Law at viii (Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds., 1955).
3. C.P. Cavafy, Waiting for the Barbarians, in Collected Poems (E. Keeley & G. Savidis
eds., 1975). To establish context, I reproduce the close of the poem:
Why this sudden bewilderment, this confusion? (How serious people's faces have
become.) Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, everyone going
home lost in thought? Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven't come.
And some of our men just in from the border say there are no barbarians any
longer. Now what's going to happen to us without barbarians? Those people were
a kind of solution.
4. This sense of aimlessness is heightened, not alleviated, by the current widespread
acceptance of classical liberal virtues, both political and economic, in the developing world.
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eral world view of any political significance, and consequently the
only vital external perspective on the liberal project of public inter-
national law.5 I do not think we should learn from the Muslim
world in the time-honored way of meeting our cultural other
through warfare. I prefer a degree of aimlessness and theoretical
ambiguity to the certainty of violence. Regrettably, much of the
recent florescence of articles and books about the Islamic world
locate themselves in relation to fundamentalist Islam's potential for
violence. Islam is substituted for communism or fascism as the ide-
ology of the barbarians. Despite the belligerent sources of my
Introduction, I think it time to turn to Islam because we are con-
fronted by peace. I do not think tutelage is in order-I am neither
an apologist for pubic international law nor a convert to Islam. I
do believe, however, that in examining Islam we who work toward
-an international legal order, and particularly those of us with a
Western background, deepen our self-understanding.
Over the years, a number of scholars have attempted to define
Islamic international law, and to square Islamic understandings of
international law with the secular, and generally Western, edifice of
public international law. In this Article, I examine several of these
attempts to articulate Islamic international law. I argue that these
attempts either fail to address the concerns of public international
law or fail to locate legal authority in Islam-fail, that is, to be
substantively Islamic. This analytical problem has a political corol-
lary: how are Islamic nations to comport themselves in an essen-
tially un-Islamic legal regime, a regime whose legality they suspect?
Secularized participation in the international legal regime-partici-
pation by actors who also happen to be Muslim-appears to be
inadequate to the profound need in Muslim countries for the law,
including public international law, to have what we in the West
generally understand as religious legitimacy. I conclude this Arti-
cle by outlining the requirements of a law that responds to the con-
cerns of public international law and is yet Islamically
authoritative. To render that possibility real is beyond me; I leave
that task to an Islamic voice.
Writing comparative law is always difficult because communica-
5. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 45 (1992). I do not
think it necessary to defend "sole," or even to articulate a definition of "coherent." In any
event, Islam provides a non-liberal jurisprudence in contradistinction to the Western liberal
scheme of public international law.
1993]
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tion is largely about shared meanings, and comparative law
explores the difference of meanings. Even for comparative law,
however, this Article contains an inordinate number of self-con-
scious, and certainly questionable, choices (beginning with the
title!). Alphabet, language, legal culture, and general culture-all
are different in Islamic law, and communicating those differences
(often only dimly understood) to a Western audience poses great
difficulties. The most basic difficulty is vocabulary. For those unfa-
miliar with the Arabic legal terms used here, I have appended a
brief glossary. More problematically, I have numerous method-
ological objections to the usual approaches to Islamic international
law, and have therefore made a number of decisions, ranging in
importance from the merely linguistic (the conscious use of Islamic
legal terms) to the fundamental (the nature of law). Were my
objections fewer, I would have briefly explained my decisions here,
in the Introduction. Given the number and length of my objec-
tions, however, I have decided to explain many of my choices in an
Afterword. I trust the Article is comprehensible without prior
explanation of my method; the troubled specialist or the irate critic
may draw some comfort from my post hoc justification.
Alongside my effort to describe and analyze Islamic approaches
to international law, I attempt to show, albeit in tentative and frag-
mentary fashion, the attraction that Islamic law holds for those
who think in terms of public international law. Whether due to its
creation myth, born out of the wars of religion, or its philosophical
heritage of liberalism and its jurisprudential heritage of positivism,
or a diplomatic commitment to neutrality, or some other reason or
combination of reasons, public international law is silent on much
of great legal significance. For instance, the relationship between
conscience and the legal obligation of public officials, or the legal
nature of truth, for another, are topics which are oft-discussed in
Islamic law and on which public international law is virtually
mute. In expressing these things Islamic law does not simply fill
lacunae in Western systems. Islamic law provides a different
framework for viewing the world, an external perspective from
which we can examine the beauties and the failings of our own legal
ideals. I conclude that Islamic law, at least as imagined by the
scholars surveyed here, cannot provide a legal articulation of the
world order. The discourses are separate: Islamic international law
does not address the concerns, or remedy the failings, of public
[Vol. 33:819
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international law. As a professional matter, I find this separation
both disconcerting-a cause of legal misunderstanding-and inter-
esting-a rich source of problems for the comparativist. As a
human matter, the distance between the discourses is sad, and in
understanding that sadness, I hope to shed some light on the possi-
bility that each law holds forth.
1I. A BRIEF SURVEY OF ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Arabic word for Islamic law is shari'a. Shari'a is a difficult
concept, quite different from Western notions about law, but a pre-
liminary understanding of it is necessary in order to grasp much of
the motivation behind and the problems confronting the attempt to
articulate an Islamic international law. Abstractly, shari'a is the
path revealed by God through the Prophets which God intends
humanity to follow. Shari'a both articulates the transcendent will
of God, and provides an opportunity for righteous action in every
occasion faced by humans. Not merely a framework in which life
is conducted, nor solely a bound for permissible action, the shari'a
itself is an expression of divine truth. Sovereignty is divine, and
therefore the will of God, even regarding daily matters, is what
lends legal authority to power. Submission to shari'a-following
the path of God-is Islam. The law sets forth the integuments of
belief and so defines the righteous life and makes salvation possible.
Vogel defines shari'a through exegesis of the Qur'an:
Through revelation man is given the boon of an explicit
way of life, a plain road, following which one can achieve
one's good here and beyond. Again, the Qur'an declares
that God has "perfected your religious law [din] for you"
[5:3]. This revealed paradigm, by which man's conscious
life is shown its place in the cosmic order, is the divine
"law." The Arabic term for this law is the shari'a, liter-
ally, "a path to water." The name has its origins in the
Qur'an:
And finally, [O Muhammad,] We have set thee
on a way of [God's] Command [shari'atin min
al-amr]: so follow thou this [way], and follow
not the whims [ahwa] of those who do not
know. [45:48]
The revelation gives man indispensable "guidance,"
19931
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teaches "what he did not know," and gives specific com-
mands-such as the prescribed ritual prayer-that he
could never intuit.
Thus, then, have we bestowed from on high
this (divine writ) as an ordinance [hukm] in the
Arabic tongue. And, indeed, if thou shouldst
defer to men's likes and dislikes after all the
knowledge that has come to thee, thou wouldst
have none to protect thee from God .... [13:37]
Since the Qur'an is a "clear book," in "clear Arabic,"
making all "clear," one now knows God's commands.
Absolved of all doubts and uncertainties, one's dilemma is
now perfectly sharp: the fatal choice between submission
[islam] and rebellion (kufr, denial of the truth, infidelity).
If one does not willingly uphold God's order, it is not for
lack of knowledge, but because one willfully, perversely,
denies clear signs. If one's acts are inspired by futile self-
will, one rebels, foolishly, vainly, against God's order; if
one's acts conform to God's commands, then one fulfills
God's order as viceregent. In either case, God's com-
mands are ineluctable, vindicated in the unseen.
No knowledge is more vital or urgent, therefore, than
knowledge of the shari'a, God's revealed law, which
guides man in all actions and thoughts. By knowledge of
it, one attains, deep within one's individual conscience,
unity of the "is" and the "ought." By such knowledge,
and not faith alone, mankind enters into utter reality, and
into harmony with nature and fate.6
For the Muslim, the problem of right action is resolved by
acquiring knowledge of shari'a, God's plan, which would inform
6. Frank E. Vogel, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia 53-55 (1993)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (citations omitted). Vogel's use of
Luther is intriguing, if perhaps a bit misleading. Faith alone, sola fide, is a question of
salvation, not harmony. Luther did not expect in this world, and does not seem to have
experienced, much unity between the is and the ought, much harmony with his nature or
faith. Because for Luther salvation is grounded in faith, it requires only a modicum of
knowledge, specifically openness to the word of God. Cf. infra text accompanying note 80
(relating the aims of a present-day reformer An-Na'im).
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and justify action and is the foundation of Islam itself.' But the
shari'a is complex. While the Qur'an is made up of direct revela-
tions, few are explicit legal commands. The Qur'an does not con-
stitute a legal code. The text of the Qur'an is supplemented by
reports (ahadith) of the speech and actions of the Prophet and his
companions. Collectively these reports form the second body of
revelation and the second source of Islamic law, the sunna. Unfor-
tunately, the opinions of scholars vary regarding both the authen-
ticity and the meaning of individual hadith. Moreover, subtleties of
meaning abound, as do questions of application. In short, organiz-
ing the material of the Muslim tradition so that it expresses the
command of God and not the faulty understanding of men is an
enormous-and vitally important-intellectual task.
Establishing the content of shari'a required the development of a
complex methodology, a science, called usul al-fiqh (fiqh).
Usul al-fiqh is conceived as the science of methods by
which God's ultimately unknowable law, transcendent,
batin, unseen, may be approached with the greatest epis-
temological security; or it is the science of gleaning from
the revealed texts every shred of guidance, every indica-
tion or hint, towards God's pure will, while quelling arbi-
trary human guesswork and willfulness.8
So while knowledge is the road to salvation, and knowledge is
available to humanity, knowledge is not easily accessible. Fiqh
works by establishing algorithms for judgment, hierarchies of
knowledge. The most basic hierarchy is of the sources of Islamic
law itself. As organized by al-Shafi'i in the second century of the
Islamic era, there are four sources of Islamic law: Qur'an, sunna
7. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law 1 (1964) ("'slamic law is the
epitome of Islamic thought, the most typical manifestation of the Islamic way of life, the
core and kernel of Islam itself.").
8. Vogel, supra note 6, at 75-76; see also Schacht, supra note 7, at 1:
The very term fikh [fiqh], 'knowledge,' shows that early Islam regarded
knowledge of the sacred Law as the knowledge par excellence. Theology has
never been able to achieve a comparable importance in Islam; only mysticism was
strong enough to challenge the ascendancy of the Law over the minds of the
Muslims, and often proved victorious.
For a highly, perhaps overly, objective account of the technical development offiqh, see
also Schacht's chapter entitled Early Systematic Reasoning, Lawyers of the Second Cen-
tury, in id. at 37-48.
1993]
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(tradition), Uma (consensus), and qiyas (analogy).9 The Qur'an
informs the understanding of the sunna; sunna, in turn, determines
the scope and stuff of consensus; and scholarly consensus, Uma,
constrains the scope of analogy. More complicated hierarchies are
built on this framework. Hierarchies are used to judge the potency
of truth in a variety of situations, including the authenticity of a
text, the scope of a teaching, and the validity of a ruling. 10 Usul al-
fiqh erects an immense conduit of authority, stretching from God
through text and scholarship to concrete judgment. Ultimately,
divine sovereignty is organized by exegetical methodology.
Fiqh aspires to discern the path of shari'a. In finding divine
authority,fiqh solves, indeed dissolves, what the West often regards
as separate and conflicting desires, the aspirations to the true and to
the good. Islamic legal authority rests on divine sovereignty; and
9. For a more complete explanation of al-Shafi'i, see N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic
Law 53-61 (1964); see also Schacht, supra note 7, at 45-48. Schacht's assertion that al-
Shafl'i's thought, and by extension thefiqh, separated law and religion is unbelievable:
We therefore find him [Shafi'i] hardly ever influenced in his conscious legal
thought by material considerations of a religious or ethical kind, such as had
played an important part in the doctrines of Awza'i, Malik, Ibn Abi Layla, and
Abu Hanifa. We also find him more consistent than his predecessors in
separating the moral and the legal aspects, whenever both arise with regard to the
same problem.
Id. at 46. Contra Coulson, supra, at 55-56:
In particular, the repeated command to "obey God and his Prophet" established
the precedents of Muhammad as a source of law second only to the word of God
himself.
... Expounding, for the first time consistently, a notion which before him had
been but vaguely mooted, he insisted that the Prophet's legal decisions were
divinely inspired. For ash-Shafi'i this was the inescapable significance of the
Qur'anic command to obey God and his Prophet and the similar injunction to
follow "the Book and the Wisdom (hikma)"; for this last term could mean only
the actions of Muhammad. The recognition of the Traditions (hadith, precedents
of the Prophet) as a source of the divine will complementary to the Qur'an is the
supreme contribution of ash-Shafi'i to Islamic jurisprudence. His arguments
proved irrefutable, and once they were accepted Traditions could no longer be
rejected by objective criticism of their content; their authority was binding unless
the authenticity of the report itself could be denied.
The religious and legal authority of the Sunna is one and the same, and Schacht's attempt
to discuss Shafi'i in terms of a positivist notion of legal development, i.e., a historically
progressive separation of law from religion, is comprehensible only in terms of Schacht's,
and not Shafi'i's, intellectual milieu.
10. Fiqh differs from Western notions of law not least in its attention to problems of
judgment. In the West, very little is said about judgment. Judges, we are often reminded,
inevitably have discretion, but Western legal culture has concentrated on the limits to
discretion, and spent relatively little energy on articulating its substance.
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for God, truth and will are one. The righteous exercise of power
requires not just mundane authority and the intention to do right,
but the deep-seated knowledge that one is absolutely correct.
"Islamically, all issues of power--God's power over man, man's
power over himself, man's power over others-can be resolved only
by knowledge of God's truth. Knowledge is an urgent necessity; on
it depends whether acting one securely does justice, or instead arro-
gantly risks injustice, defying the ineluctable."'"
As approached throughfiqh, shari'a poses questions of ultimate
truth as revealed by concrete texts and as occasioned by specific
situations. Fiqh confronts mundane politics, action in the world of
petty desires and apparent variety of paths, with ultimate ques-
tions. 12 How can one know that a particular decision, in a world of
confusion, is right, is what God wills? The relationship between
knowledge and righteousness "instills in the exercise of power a
mortal epistemological anxiety, and bequeaths to fiqh an epistemo-
logical obsession."1 3  Whether such an anxious vision of legal
authority can serve to construct international law is the topic of
this Article.
Within the framework of the shari'a as a whole, the Islamic tra-
dition of international law is informed by its own narrative, the
siyar. Siyar is the plural of sirat, the conduct of the ruler. Sirat
11. Vogel, supra note 6, at 392-93.
12. Vogers work is devoted to exploring the ways in which Islamic legal reality differs
from that of the West. To do so, he uses a variety of oppositions, notably "metuordering"
and "panordering." Id. at 61-72. Metaordering is the aspiration to link banality with
ultimate truth, illustrated by fiqh's obsession with direct revelation. Panordering is the
aspiration to offer a meaning for the breadth of existence, illustrated by siyasa. Vogel's
thesis is that metaordering aspirations have dominated Islamic legal theory, particularly
the theory of the usul al-fiqh developed by the ulama. Id. at 68-72. These metaordering
aspirations impose a particular structure on the law, often at considerable cost. Many of
the difficulties with metaordering, e.g., an obsession with history, hostility to institutions,
and a delegitimization of normal politics, will emerge in the course of this Article. Vogel
argues that Islamic law need not commit itself so completely to metaordering, and that
panordering aspirations, particularly siyasa, are equally legitimated within the Islamic
tradition (that is, insofar as the tradition is considered by someone other than the 'ulama).
Id. at 61-78.
13. Id. at 393. Other streams of Islamic thought do not argue the exclusivity of usul al-
fiqh in establishing truth. "For example, Shi'ism, mysticism [Sufism, tasawwuJ], Islam c
philosophy [falsafa] recognize respectively continuation of divine guidance (im the Imams),
mystic inspiration, and reason, as complementary, alternative or overriding avenues to
truth." Id. at 67 n.39. The question is the extent to which these, or still other streams of
Islamic thought devote themselves to the problem of legal authority.
19931
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"acquired later the restricted sense of the conduct of the Prophet in
his wars, and later still the conduct of Muslim rulers in interna-
tional affairs." 14 The siyar is thus a specialized set of traditions and
commentary on the conduct of war and affairs of state by the early,
and-by virtue of their proximity to the Prophet-the rightly
guided, Muslims. The most influential compilation of the siyar is
that of Shaybani, a jurist who died circa 804 CA, but whose work
continues to inform Islamic international law.15 The primary
source of Islamic international law, then, is preoccupied with the
conduct of state during wartime.
While there are great differences among them, the scholars sur-
veyed here share this preoccupation, which can be expressed more
fully in terms of three related oppositions: peace and war, dar al-
islam and dar al-harb, and Islamic authority and Western cate-
gory.16 Islam classically identifies the realm of peace with the
realm of shared belief, the dar al-islam. Because the realm of law
and the realm of belief are identical, a triune identification of peace,
belief, law-and its converse, war, unbelief, chaos-is conceptually
unproblematic. But historically, in a world of peoples trying to live
together without slaughter, insistence on agreement on matters of
belief as a precondition for lasting peace is highly problematic. As
the Introduction suggested, when similar oppositions have shaped
the Western political identity, the results have often been violent.
The solution that public international law offers is the idea that
14. Muhammed Hamidullah, The Muslim Conduct of State 13 (1973); see also The
Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar 39 (Majid Khadduri trans., 1966) [hereinafter
Khadduri] (Khadduri spells the word sira, and notes "[tihe term literally meant motion.").
15. Khadduri, supra note 14, at 22. Other scholars produced their own versions of the
siyar. For a listing of other treatises on the siyar, without publication data, see Mohammed
Bedjaoui, The Gulf War of 1980-1988 and the Islamic Conception of International Law,
Address at the 1990 Asser Colloquium on International Law (Nov. 1990), in The Gulf War
of 1980-1988, at 277, 294 n.20 (Ige F. Dekker & Harry H.G. Post eds., 1992). I
concentrate on Shaybani because he has been translated into English, and so can be read as
a primary source, and because the publicists examined here, with the exception of Bedjaoul,
focus on him.
16. By "category" I mean conceptual entities with which the law works. The "nation"
is an obvious example of a category important to international law. Another example is the
idea of international law itself. Certain, but not all, constellations of people, land, and
government are nations; certain, but not all, affairs on the international stage are global.
Great debate exists over the definition and contents of these and other categories important
for a discourse on political relations. The very language of this debate, and ultimately of
the categories themselves, is Western. Rephrased, the phenomena of global politics are
understood in Western fashion, if not always in ways consonant with Western interests.
[Vol. 33:819
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peace arises not from shared belief, but from an order that allows
for different beliefs. The basic categories in which Western public
international law traffics do not purport to represent the substan-
tive beliefs of the nation: Marxist, Christian, and Islamic nations
are all equally nations, each legally bound to do their part in main-
taining international order. The resolution of issues of war and
peace, legal order and disorder, does not require adversaries to
share belief.
Islamic scholars, who locate legal authority with God, cannot so
easily separate law and belief. The public international law solu-
tion of order without shared belief is not available to Islamic schol-
ars, insofar as their work is informed by Islam. Still, the solution
remains attractive, on its merits and because it is the framework
used by the non-Islamic world to articulate large-scale political
arrangements. For Islamic scholars, international law is a contin-
ual attempt to reconcile Islamic authority and Western category.
They vacillate between adoption of the Western solution, the secu-
larization of international legal authority, and reconsideration of
the traditional Islamic position, which cannot be maintained in the
contemporary world. The arguments they make within Western
categories are not authoritative to a Muslim. The arguments they
make from Islamic authority do not confront the political organiza-
tion of the contemporary world. A truly Islamic international law
would still this vacillation, and the categories of contemporary poli-
tics, despite their Western heritage, would be legitimated-that is,
rendered Islamically authoritative.
The emphasis on war in the Islamic tradition of international law
scholarship is oft-remarked. For example, "[lt should be noted
that the Islamic tradition today seems most alive in the area of the
jus ad bellum,"'17 and "a traditional connexion is traced between
war and Islam by interested writers."18 The siyar provides a great
deal of discussion of a rather limited number of issues, and because
each scholar surveyed here either founds his position on an exegesis
of the siyar, or is preoccupied with responding to the orthodox exe-
gesis of the siyar, it is this limited set of issues which dominates
each of these discussions of international law. Even the scholars
17. Ann E. Mayer, War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition of International Law, in Just
War and Jihad 195, 197 (John Kelsay & James T. Turner eds., 1991).
18. Hamidullah, supra note 14, at 165.
1993]
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who appear most sophisticated to my eyes, 'AbuSulayman and An-
Na'im, take their examples almost exclusively from texts dealing
with military problems. For instance, how badly must a Muslim
force be outnumbered in order to be permitted to withdraw honora-
bly? The relevance of these texts to a broad discourse on interna-
tional law is open to question; and where the siyar is silent, it is
difficult to see what these texts, or these scholars, have to say about
international law. To exaggerate: rather than being an area of diffi-
culty and divergence, jus ad bellum, and its less developed sibling,
jus in bello, seem to be the only areas where the disciplines of public
international law and Islamic law converge.19
19. The relationship between human rights law and Islamic law is examined by Ann E.
Mayer in Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (1991). As a Westerner, Mayer
reports on rather than expounds Islamic thinking on international law. While that suffices
to remove her work from analysis in the text, the breadth of her bibliography and range of
her political discussion warrant attention. Mayer sees conflict rather than convergence
between Islamic law, at least as the term is currently used, and international human rights
law. She contends that Islamic rhetoric has been deployed by political elites for self-
interested ends. "As this assessment has indicated, these Islamic human rights schemes are
products of the political context in which they emerged. Their Islamic pedigrees are
dubious." Id. at 207. Similarly, "[a] skeptic could propose that official Islamization policy
is no more than a strategy adopted by beleaguered elites in an attempt to trump growing
Muslim demands for democratization and human rights." Id. at 31. By the end of her
book, Mayer has revealed herself to be just such a skeptic. Her concluding sentence reads:
All this draws one to conclude that the patterns of diluted rights in Islamic
human rights schemes should not be ascribed to peculiar features of Islam or
Islamic culture but should be seen as part of a broader phenomenon of attempts
by beneficiaries of undemocratic and hierarchical systems to legitimize their
opposition to human rights by appeals to supposedly distinctive cultural
traditions.
Id. at 215. Although Mayer contends that political abuse does not vitiate the religious
authority of true Islam, id. at 211 ("However often the terminology and references invoke
religious sources and authority, the stakes in the battle over human rights standards are
ultimately political."), she offers no real discussion of Islamic legal authority. Mayer
presents no Islamic view of international law, but, at best, suggests that Islam may be able
to accommodate essentially Western notions of human rights. Despite a superficial resem-
blance, Mayer's substantive concerns fundamentally differ from those taken up by this
Article. Where Mayer's book is programatically concerned with Islamic rhetoric as a bar
to progress, this Article attempts to learn about legal traditions, including "progressive"
ones, through comparison. Methodologically, Mayer regards both Islamic law and interna-
tional human rights from an external perspective, in which the law, in its political, histori-
cal, and religious context, is an object fit for rather clinical analysis. So when she speaks of
distortions of Islamic doctrines or of a betrayal of Islamic principles by political elites, one
is skeptical. To judge betrayal one must understand allegiance, and that is a subjective, not
an objective, stance. The present Article, in contrast, treats both Islamic law and public
international law (and hence human rights law) as expressions of world order; that is, from
a subjective, internal perspective. For more on my methodology and comparative law, see
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Mohammed Bedjaoui, Judge of the International Court of Jus-
tice, analyzes the Gulf War of 1980-1988 in terms of "some other
key, some other possible reading of the War, another system of ref-
erences drawn from Islamic international law," and asks "whether
that legal order can provide some elements enabling the situation to
be understood and dealt with in a coherent and effective way."'2
Bedjaoui thus suggests the thesis of the present Article, that public
international law and Islamic international law are different dis-
courses or, in his words, different keys, to ordering international
affairs. In the core of his remarks, Bedjaoui translates many of the
issues raised by public international law scholarship into the idiom
of the siyar, discusses their legality in Islamic terms, and then con-
cludes that "one arrives at virtually the same legal analysis of the
1980-1988 Gulf War whatever 'key' be used, whether that of public
international law or that of Islamic law."'21  For Bedjaoui, both
Islamic international law and public international law, at least
when regarding the use of force, seem to have the same ultimate
concerns.
22
Shaybani's siyar, the root of Islamic international law, has been
translated into English by Majid Khadduri3 With great diffi-
dence, Khadduri reads Shaybani as an Islamic Hugo Grotius.24
the Afterword. For a review of Mayer's book, see Abdulaziz Sachedina, Book Review, 34
J. of Church and St. 614 (1992).
20. Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 278. Although substantively interesting, the
circumstances of Bedjaoui's remarks limited their scope, so I do not respond to Bedjaoui at
length. I have the same problems with his article, in its Islamic law moments, that I have
with the other publicists of Islamic international law. At the same time, of the publicists
surveyed here, Bedjaoui unsurprisingly has the most powerful understanding of public
international law. Because he operates within both Islamic and public international law,
Bedjaoui illustrates within small compass the difficulties of translation, the space between
the cultures. He is a near-perfect interlocutor for the concerns of this Article, and is
therefore cited frequently in the notes. Finally, Bedjaoui relies almost exclusively on
French sources, and so provides some bibliography for French scholarship.
21. Id. at 298-99.
22. But see infra note 126 (for Bedjaoui's suggestion that Islamic international law might
be something different in kind from contemporary public international law).
23. Khadduri, supra note 14.
24. Khadduri writes:
In designating Shaybani as the Hugo Grotius of Islam, it is questionable whether
Joseph Hammer had more in mind than to call the attention of scholars to the
master's works. Shaybani (d. 804) preceded Grotius (d. 1645) by some eight
centuries and composed his works on a system of law whose appeal to students of
the history of law is greater than to students of the modem law of nations. But a
study of the Islamic law of nations would certainly be of interest to all who seek
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For example, "a notice to the enemy demanding denunciation of
... [the treaty] must first be sent, together with the reason for it.
The principle of rebus sic stantibus seems to be applied here; other-
wise, the Imam must abide by the treaty on the strength of the
principle pacta sunt servanda.' ' 25  Consistently expounding his idea
of Islamic international law in articles as well as books, Khadduri
repeatedly equates Islamic concepts with the concepts of public
international law. Jihad, for example, is just war.26  For Khad-
duri, the siyar provides the Western law of war from Islamic
sources. Khadduri's translation of the Islamic law into the West-
ern idiom attempts to be so complete that, were it to be successful,
actually reading the siyar would be unnecessary for the Westerner
who has an adequate understanding of public international law.27
In presenting an answer where there is no obvious question,
Khadduri assumes the characteristically reactive stance of the
Islamic publicist. The form of the reactions to public international
to broaden the scope and subject matter of the modem law of nations. Shaybani
will always be remembered as the most eminent Muslim jurist who wrote on
Islam's legal relationships with other nations and may well be called the father of
the science of the Islamic law of nations. But to identify the name of Shaybani
with Grotius, even though the latter is the most illustrious writer on the modem
law of nations, will not necessarily add laurels to a classical author whose place in
the history of jurisprudence is assured, notwithstanding the fact that he is
insufficiently known to students of comparative jurisprudence.
Id. at 57. Khadduri's focus on Grotius as a vibrant source of authority sounds strange to
Western ears. Nobody in the West actually reads Grotius, whereas Shaybani is a primary
source for Islamic scholarship. Grotius, like the Peace of Westphalia, is a mythic beginning
for contemporary public international lawyers. Our self-understanding of public interna-
tional law "goes back" to Grotius, and no further. Publicists hardly speak of a modern
intgrnational law prior to Grotius and the Peace of Westphalia. Similarly, English consti-
tutional law "goes back" to Magna Carta. But creation myths need not be detailed; few
international lawyers could say much about either Grotius or the Peace of Westphalia.
Shaybani, in contrast, is a point of reference and an object of discussion. Each of the
scholars surveyed here discusses his work at length.
25. Id. at 55.
26. Majid Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 Am. J. Int'l. L. 358, 359
(1956) [hereinafter Khadduri, Modern Law of Nations]; see also Majid Khadduri, The
Islamic System: Its Competition and Co-Existence with Western Systems, 1959 Am. Soc.
Int'l L. Proc. 49 (1959) [hereinafter Khadduri, The Islamic System] ("Thus thejihad was
the Islamic bellum justum."); see also Bedjaoui supra note 15, at 287, 288 n.7.
27. Khadduri does think there are specifically Islamic contributions to be made to public
international law. See Khadduri, supra note 14, at xii-xiii ("To draw on the experiences of
an increasing number of nations is as logical as it is pragmatic .... [T]he public law of
Islam ... played an important role in the past and produced a system of law that was no
less significant than the Roman.").
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law vary, including blanket assimilation,28 reform and revision,"
claims that the Islamic view of international law is prior to the
Western view that dominates public international law,30 claims that
Western law willfully ignored Islamic international law,31 the
excuse that Islamic international law was prevented from develop-
ing by the political subjugation of Muslim nations,32 and funda-
mentalist declarations of open hostility to Western ideas of
international law.33 The common awkward thread among these
positions is their self-definition vis-A-vis the West:
Unlike Western writers on international law, who appear
uninterested in the Islamic tradition and how it may differ
from the siyar, Muslims who write on international law
do so with an awareness that public international law, a
product of Western culture, is universally entrenched as
the normative standard and will be used to judge Islamic
legal doctrines, which will be deemed defective if they
violate the international norms. Muslims may adopt a
defensive stance when comparing Islamic rules on war
and peace with their international counterparts, so that
apologetic preoccupations rather than scholarly ones ulti-
mately inform their work.34
"Apologetic preoccupations" perhaps too narrowly characterizes
the reactions of Islamic publicists to public international law.35
Still, the responses of Islamic scholars are reactive: international
law is perceived as something outside (traditional) Islam, which
28. Id.
29. 'AbdulHamid 'A. 'AbuSulayman, The Islamic Theory of International Relations:
New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought (1987).
30. Hamidullah, supra note 14, at 68-75; see also Marcel A. Boisard, On the Probable
Influence of Islam on Western Public and International Law, 11 Intl J. Middle E. Stud.
429, 447 (1980).
31. Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 294.
32. Id. at 295-296.
33. For example, the hostility expressed through the rhetoric of Khomeini and Quadamfi.
But see Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and International
Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 Harv. Int'l L.J. 145 (1992)
(discussing Khomeini's approach to international law).
34. Mayer, supra note 17, at 221 n.8.
35. I also do not think one can claim that "apologetic preoccupations" should be read in
the classical sense, that is, as "defenses" that actually set the standard, and are
consequently defenses merely in form.
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Islam needs to account for, respond to, explain, or make useless.3 6
For the Islamic scholar, public international law is foreign.37 As a
consequence, the authority of public international law over Mus-
lims, its legal quality, is inherently problematic.
38
A contemporary of Khadduri, Hamidullah, in his oft-reprinted
and influential The Muslim Conduct of State, attempts to construct
a full-fledged political theory from the siyar. However, despite its
aspirations to self-sufficiency, Hamidullah's theory remains vexed
by its problematic discourse with Western tradition. Part I, Intro-
ductory, has two concerns. The first is the definition of terms.
Arabic terminology, e.g., siyar, must be made available for non-
Arab speakers. Furthermore, the Arabic words need to be located
within the grammar of public international law, i.e., sources, sanc-
tions, subjects, and so forth. The second concern is to relate a
global history of international law, a history in which Islam plays a
critical role.
36. "Islam can pass yet another moral test of democracy, which although being of a
formal nature is indispensable to its functioning, namely, the requirement that a
government should not only rule by law, but also reckon in all its decisions with the wishes
of the ruled" and "[t]he Muslims' record, over the whole span of history, on this rare civic
virtue in inter-cultural relationships is decidedly superior to that of Westerners." Hamid
Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought 129 (1982). It is difficult to imagine similar
sentences, in which Western practices are judged by Islamic "moral tests," coming from a
Western pen.
37. Bedjaoui writes:
With a few rare exceptions, jurists from the newly independent Muslim countries
have succumbed to the easy temptation of lazily imitating the West instead of
meeting the more demanding needs of creativity. From the Atlantic to the Sunda
Islands, the great majority of treatises and manuals of international law published
in the Muslim world are western works translated into the local language by those
jurists, who are thus reduced to the role of translators and copyists.
Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 296.
38. The problematic authority of public international law in the Muslim world can be
interestingly contrasted with two kinds of authority problematic for many in the West,
religious law and international law. The issues might be stated as follows. First, does
Islamic law exist? More crudely, is it law and not religious despotism? Second, does public
international law exist? If so, to what extent is it binding and enforceable? Is it law or just
vacuous idealism or power politics? The Western problems can be traced to the same
source, a world-view (positivism, realism) that assigns law-making power exclusively to the
nation-state and asserts that nations are self-interested. Virtually no one-at least within
the discourse of international law-takes these positions as stated in their extreme and
abstract form; i.e., as claims that public international law has no validity in the Muslim
world, or that Islamic law does not exist, or that public international law does not exist.
Nevertheless, a challenge to authority, once made, is not easily excised. All three
challenges are durable, and vex attempts to construct a more inclusive vision of public
international law.
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In Part 11 of his book, Peace, Hamidullah turns to the substance
of Islamic international law. The language of Hamidullah's
account of state conduct, like Khadduri's, recalls Western legal
doctrines, and he entitles the sections "Preliminary Survey," "Inde-
pendence," "Property," "Jurisdiction," and "Diplomacy." Peace,
Part II, is dwarfed by Part III, Hostile Relations, with twenty six
sections, and Part IV, Neutrality, with five sections. Hamidullah's
emphasis on war is captured by his subtitle: "Being a Treatise on
Siyar, that is Islamic notion of Public International Law, Consist-
ing of the Laws of Peace, War and Neutrality, Together with
Precedents from Orthodox Practice." While the language could
well be from a Western international law text, the substance of the
various parts, together with their relative proportions, reveals
Hamidullah's conceptual reliance on the siyar.
Khadduri and Hamidullah both work for the convergence of
Islamic international law on public international law, for the
Islamic accommodation with a liberal legal regime, aspirationally
neutral, procedural, rational, universal, and, most problematically,
secular. They thus present the odd position that Islamic law will
ultimately be secular law: "The historical experiences of Islam and
Christendom in introducing a religious element in politics, on the
international no less than on the domestic plane, can be very dan-
gerous indeed." 39 But what is a secular Islamic polity? Anathema,
answer many, and since Khadduri wrote, his idea that "[t]wentieth
century Islam has reconciled itself completely to the Western secu-
lar system" 4 has become ridiculous.4"
Hasan Moinuddin takes a somewhat different approach to the
relationship between Islamic international law and public interna-
39. Khadduri, Modem Law of Nations, supra note 26, at 372.
40. Khadduri, supra note 14, at 67.
41. For sociologists who talk about relatively objective interests, spiritual conflict
between nations does not exist, or can be minimized. See James Piscatori, Islam in the
International Order, in The Expansion of International Society (Hedley Bull & Adam
Watson eds., 1984). I have three disagreements with this work. First, Piscatori's
putatively objective approach makes his references to "unfairness" rather incoherent.
Second, an objective approach to Islamic questions obscures crucial political reality. The
participants see their actions as arising out of profound belief, not as the result of
mechanistically calculated objective interests. Third, and more generally, because legal
authority is grounded in belief, any discussion of law that assumes an objective approach is
ultimately sterile.
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tional law.42 For Moinuddin, Islamic states are those states that
are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC).43 Islamic international law is nothing more than the juridi-
cal relationships among those states. In order to reach this conclu-
sion, Moinuddin confronts the orthodox explanations of Islamic
international law, the siyar and its explicators. By parsing article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Moinuddin
denies Khadduri's assertion that the Islamic international law of
the siyar and public international law operate with the same catego-
ries under different names." Having stressed the cultural differ-
ences that underlie the siyar, Moinuddin argues that the siyar itself
is hardly relevant to modern Islamic international law. The siyar is
restricted in scope to the confrontation between Islam and its ene-
mies. Indeed, few modern relations among Islamic states are car-
ried out under the legal principles of the siyar, and Islamic states
have not relied on the siyar as a basis for external legal relations
with the West:
Islamic states have joined the UN and have accepted
international law as the basis of relations between States
in the contemporary world .... In the sphere of interna-
tional relations, however, the "re-assertion" of Islamic
values does not necessarily mean the reintroduction of
classical doctrines of Siyar; it is, rather, the reinforcement
of general principles of law with ethical content.45
Having dismissed the siyar for practical purposes, Moinuddin
oddly discusses the well-trod ground of the siyar's validity for con-
temporary international relations. He argues that the siyar is the
construction of Abbasid jurists, is not consonant with the Qur'an
and Sunna, and is therefore invalid for contemporary relations.46
As a result, Moinuddin can ignore whatever arguments might be
drawn from the siyar and claim both that jihad is highly limited
and that the normal external relations of Muslim states are
peaceful.
42. Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of
Economic Co-Operation among its Member States (1987).
43. Id. at 11.
44. Id. at 16-17.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 20.
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The most appropriate argument, however, harmonizing
the Koranic message and the spirit of the Jihad injunc-
tion, was offered by Ibn Taymiya who held that unbeliev-
ers who made no attempt to encroach upon the Dar al-
Islam would not have Islam imposed upon them by force
for he said "if the unbeliever were to be killed unless he
becomes a Muslim, such an action would constitute the
greatest compulsion in religion" which would run con-
trary to the Koranic rule: "There is no compulsion in
religion.
'47
Moinuddin then plunges into a lengthy discussion of the misin-
terpretation of the doctrine offihad. He argues that classical inter-
pretations of the doctrine are wrong and that the doctrine much
more closely approximates classical Western ideas of the bellum
justum.4 Jihad is now to be interpreted in light of the U.N. rules
on the use of force and the developing country views about wars of
liberation from colonial oppressors.49 By this point the differences
between Moinuddin and Khadduri are not so obvious.
Moinuddin argues that relations between Muslim states and
Christian states in the Middle Ages and since were not solely belli-
cose.50 Treaties existed, as did numerous other inter-state relations,
and the practice of states is a source, or at least an indication, of
public international law. Moinuddin argues that this practice
should be taken to demonstrate the adherence of Muslim states to
bilateral relations and, hence, the bilateral character of Islamic
international law. In an argument of similar tenor, Moinuddin
argues that Islam influenced Western conceptions of law and,
therefore, that contemporary public international law should be
viewed as substantively Islamic.5"
Some of these arguments are simply bad. For example, the quo-
tation from the Qur'an which begins "There is no compulsion in
47. Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
48. Id. at 22-28.
49. Id. at 28-34.
50. Id. at 36-37, 40-42.
51. Id. at 42-45. Moinuddin relies heavily on a truly odd article, or more accurately,
narrative and bibliographical speculation, Boisard's On the Probable Influence of Islam on
Western Public and International Law, supra note 30. As with so many of these works, the
palpable desire of the author to vindicate Islam somehow makes the reader both suspicious
and uncomfortable.
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religion," continues, "Distinct has now become the right way from
error."52 For Islam, as indeed for Christianity in most times and
places, the inward quality of belief does not make belief a private,
individual matter. Belief is a matter of revealed and generally
available truth. The true path53 is visible, distinct. Thus, although
Islam acknowledges an inner experience of religion, visible con-
formity with God's law, with the public truth, can be compelled.
The shari'a is enforced. For example, a Muslim woman can be
forced to wear the veil; and even non-Muslims, to whom only parts
of the shari'a apply, can be compelled to dress appropriately, irre-
spective of their private beliefs. Such compulsion, however, cannot
make the truly recalcitrant, those bent on straying from the path of
righteousness, holy. The law has its limitations. Shari'a can
demand formal obedience, create social conditions for the righteous
life, and even teach the way of God; but actually choosing that path
is a matter for the individual, not the law. In this limited sense,
there can be no compulsion in religion.54 To quote half a line of
Qur'an as if it restated the contemporary Western doctrine that the
domains of law and belief are essentially distinct, in the face of cen-
turies of self-conscious and contradictory practice, is at best
disingenuous.55
The deployment of Moinuddin's various arguments is more
interesting than the arguments are themselves. Each of these exam-
ples demonstrates an inconclusive obsession with history, a topic to
which I shall return. Islamic scholars appear to believe that inter-
national law must be grounded in history to be authoritative. After
52. Vogel, supra note 6, at 398.
53. Recall the etymology of shari'a. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
54. Vogel, supra note 6, at 398-400. For an example of Christian thinking along
interestingly similar lines, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Treatise on Law,
Question 96, Article 2 ("Whether it belongs to human law to repress all vices").
55. In other places, Moinuddin is badly inconsistent. As noted above, he claims that the
siyar can be dismissed, but also states that "[t]he Siyar is part of the Shari'ah and hence
rules pertaining to the Siyar are part of Islamic law." Moinuddin, supra note 42, at 46.
Still other arguments are suggestive, but radically underdeveloped. For example, the
practice of the Ottoman empire may well be a source of Islamic political wisdom, id. at 41-
42, but how is it authoritative? How is law to be distinguished from politics in Ottoman
practice? Assuming this can be done, could the same categories be applied to
contemporary relations? The Ottoman empire could, perhaps, provide an exemplar of
substantively Islamic political and legal sophistication, and may thus serve to make Islamic
politics more legitimate in the eyes of its own practitioners. Nonetheless, an exemplar
requires a genus, and Moinuddin does not provide an account of how Ottoman practice
should inform contemporary judgment.
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dismissing the importance of the Islamic tradition for the contem-
porary understanding of Islamic international law, Moinuddin
spends a good portion of his book trying to reformulate that same
tradition. He does not provide, however, a thorough discussion of
how Islamic conceptions of international law are to relate to
Islamic history, or of how the Islamic tradition is going to create
legal authority in the international realm. Indeed, the only sus-
tained discussion of authority merely flogs the dead horse of the
nature of obligation at public international law.56 As do Khadduri
and Hamidullah, Moinuddin loses sight of the project of articulat-
ing an Islamic international law. He concludes his general discus-
sion of Islamic international law by essentially asserting that
contemporary public international law is simply, already, and
unproblematically Islamic.
[W]e have tried to show the underlying theoretical basis
of external relations in Islam which later enabled a sub-
stantial number of 'new' Asian and African Islamic States
to accept a universal community of nations based on uni-
versally recognized principles of international law ....
It would, therefore, be appropriate to conclude,
(a) that the theory of Jihad cannot be recognized as the
'sole' basis of external relations in Islam as it is neither
warranted by any provisions contained in the Koran nor
was it explicitly recognized as such in the practice of the
Holy Prophet;
(b) that acceptance of adherence to general principles of
international law by Islamic States is not contradictory
with the legal basis of external relations in Islam;
(c) that on the other hand acceptance of general princi-
ples of law by the Islamic States does not provide any evi-
dence of their Europeanization, Westernization, or
secularization as similar general principles of law are
common to Islam and other legal systems, religions, and
philosophies.
It is difficult to imagine a more diffident, and less Islamically
authoritative, statement of legal principles. Every single statement
is negative; not one statement expresses anything Islamic.
56. Moinuddin, supra note 42, at 45-53.
57. Id. at 65-66.
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Moinuddin proceeds from his general overview to an account of
the charter of the Islamic Conference.5" Here too, we find nothing
which is both Islamic and legal: "[T]he Charter contained no
extraordinary obligations purporting to compel any State to apply
the Islamic Shari'a or take up arms for the sake of justice and right.
Its duties and obligations were no different from any other interna-
tional organization."5 9 Islam serves, not as the ground for legal
obligation, but rather as a source of solidarity: "The formal reitera-
tion of Islam as constituting a strong factor for rapprochement and
solidarity is kept within a general framework of mutual consulta-
tion and co-operation to achieve the objectives of the Charter. '
In the end, it is unclear whether Moinuddin discusses Islamic law
in any substantive way. He discusses law among Muslim states.
Although secular Islamic law-Islamic law without Islam-is
nonsensical, it is not clear what the resurgence of religious funda-
mentalism means for public international law. Islamic fundamen-
talists are often outspoken in their rejection of Western values,
often explicitly including international law as an element of the for-
eign culture to be rejected. While religion and public international
law may be seen to conflict, public international law, in general and
by design, attempts to elide conflict with religion by avoiding sub-
stantive questions of belief in favor of procedural questions. Thus
both Islamic fundamentalists and public international lawyers
would seem to insist that Islamic law and public international law
cannot be conflated. Nonetheless, Islamic legal notions have on at
least one occasion been discussed within the lexicon of public inter-
national law. During the International Court of Justice litigation
over the Western Sahara, Islamic legal arguments were advanced
that statehood was a defacto matter within the context of the dar
al-islam. Assertions of Moroccan control of the territory were
belied by the existence of the Polisaro, and consequently, the
inhabitants had a right of self-determination, a right determined at
public international law.6'
58. Id. at 69-112.
59. Id. at 100-01.
60. Id. at 108.
61. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 40-49 (Oct. 16); see also Mayer, supra note 17,
at 213-15 (discussing Western Sahara). In general, however, issues that one might expect
to be phrased in terms of an Islamic international law have been phrased in the language of
the West, public international law. Perhaps the most remarkable example of the
willingness of "Islamic revolutionaries" to speak the language of public international law
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The arguments over Palestine are often conducted in religious
terms, includingjihad, holy war. But what is the substance of this
jihad? "The deconfessionalization of thejihad concept as it relates
to the Palestinian cause is demonstrated by a call forjihad made by
the rector of al Azhar in 1973, asserting thatjihad against Israel
was an obligation incumbent on Egyptians, regardless of whether
they were Christians or Muslim." 62 And, of course, the objective of
the Palestinianjihad is statehood, not the restoration or expansion
of the umma, the community of believers. Even the Ayatollah
Khomeini's position on jihad may be ambiguous. "Khomeini's
positions do not correspond precisely to the classical theory of
jihad, the condemnation of war in public international law, or
Third World support for struggles to throw off the yoke of super-
power domination. Instead, one sees reflections of all three."
63
For 'AbdulHamid 'A. 'AbuSulayman, Islamic thought in gen-
eral, not just fundamentalist thought, is handicapped by the con-
flicting and untenable attitudes Muslims adopt toward both the
structure of modernity and their own history.
Muslims are trapped in a single position decided by an
accident of a course of actions that took place some time
were the arguments before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, treated by Ted Stein,
Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence: The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal, 78 Am. J. Int'L L. 1 (1984). See, e.g., Esphahanian v. Bank Tajarat, 2
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 157 (1983). Finally, see Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 298:
When the Security Council took the war [the Gulf War of 1980-1988] onto its
agenda, one of the belligerents, it is true, showed some mistrust towards it, in a
manner corresponding to its usual line of conduct. But on either side, what was
invoked, both within the Council and outside it, was international law, not
Islamic law.
For documentary support of this summation, see Resolutions and Statements of the United
Nations Security Council (1946-1989) 353-76 (Karel C. Wellens ed., 1990).
62. Mayer, supra note 17, at 217.
63. Id. at 207. In a recent article, Sarvenaz Bahar similarly argues that Khomeini and
Iran draw on several sources to create a distinctively Islamic approach to international law.
Bahar, supra note 33. What Bahar means by "Islamic" is difficult to discern. Her own
imagery and argument draw on a variety of resources available to Muslim intellectuals,
ranging from a vaguely Marxist suspicion of hegemonic Western colonial powers, in which
ideology is a mask for political reality, through Yale Realism, in which ideology is a rather
mechanical expression of national interests, to Islam (in her case Sh~ite), in which religion
is the reality underlying the constitution of the nation, and, even more profoundly, the
ground for politics itself. With ideology so broadly defined, I could not assess how Bahar
thinks Islam shapes the Iranian view of international law, beyond providing a rhetoric in
which to voice a passionate, perhaps understandable, but generally unfocused discontent
with the status quo.
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back in history.... [C]ontemporary jurists and scholars
are in a state of confusion. They either speak in general,
vague terms, divorced from the actual problems and chal-
lenges facing the Muslim peoples and authorities, or they
speak from a position of idealistic fantasy, assuming a
powerful, established society and authority.... Muslim
authorities need Islamic political thought and scholarship
comprehensive enough to respond creatively to the new
realities and challenges of the contemporary world.64
'AbuSulayman presents Muslim thought as a glorious enterprise
gone astray, and like a tree whose disease is revealed only when it
falls, the weaknesses of medieval Islamic thought only became
apparent when Islam came in conflict with the West.
[T]he Western attack revealed and uncovered rather than
caused the decay of Muslim thought, and it was only a
matter of time for it to collapse, leaving the Muslim peo-
ple with nothing but the Qur'an, the Sunna, and glorious
memories of Muslim achievements. The attacks were
fatal because of the state of Muslim thought. Europe,
armed with dynamic ideas and efficient methods, based
on an empirical and rational approach, confronted the
static and rigid Muslim frame of mind, which rested on
textual deduction within the limits of the early Muslim
model. The Muslim's thinking had lost touch with real-
ity, and they were incapable of regeneration and
reorientation in the light of new developments and
demands.65
Both of these passages end by requiring a better way of thinking
Islamically. Classical thought has collapsed; Islam must begin
anew with the Islamization of knowledge. In particular, interna-
tional relations must be translated, or transmuted, into a specifi-
cally Islamic intellectual enterprise.
The book begins with an introduction by another author, al-
Shahid Dr. Isma'i R. al-Faruqi,66 who situates the development of
Islamic international law against a backdrop of the prevailing and
64. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at 107 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 44.




impoverished Western formulation of international relations and
international law.67 Acknowledging inadequacies in current Mus-
lim practice, al-Faruqi envisions a truly Islamic world order.
'AbuSulayman's daunting task is to articulate the legal visage of
this Islamic international order, to provide aspiration with method-
ological rigor and the beginnings of doctrinal detail. 'AbuSu-
layman begins this undertaking with a discussion of the classical
fiqh as applied to the siyar, the method of deriving the law from the
sacred texts. He finds four basic flaws with the practice offiqh: (1)
excessive use of naskh (abrogation); (2) failure to realize the impact
of space-time in the interpretation of hadith; (3) lack of empiricism;
and (4) lack of a systematic approach to the usul al-fiqh. Remedy-
ing these four failings should make the shari'a both broader and
more flexible, and therefore more applicable to modern life, includ-
ing contemporary international relations.
The first two flaws result from the misapprehension of the
Islamic texts that are the concern of fiqh. Taken together, these
flawed approaches to fiqh tend to narrow the scope of possible
interpretation, thereby increasing the determinacy of legal judg-
ment, but at the price of creating a rather rigid and narrow struc-
ture of rules. Because the rules offiqh are the main avenue to the
shari'a, 'AbuSulayman maintains that Islamic law itself is overly
limited in the scope and flexibility of its application. By changing
the rules of legal interpretation, 'AbuSulayman hopes to make the
law broader, more flexible, and therefore more suited to the
changed circumstances in which the Muslim world finds itself.
The first flaw in fiqh is the excessive use of naskh.68 Generally
translated as abrogation, naskh is the mode of understanding by
which a succession of texts narrows, or even repeals, an earlier,
broader ruling.6" God's revelation did not occur all at once, but
67. Isma'i R. al-Faruqi, Introduction to 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at xiii-xxix. All
the scholars surveyed here tend to conflate international law and international relations,
disciplines which have sometimes been held apart.
68. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at 35-36.
69. The common lawyer may think of the way a line of cases is progressively narrowed.
This analogy is misleading because naskh is a way of understanding revelation-God's
message, which is atemporal-in the sequence in which it was received by humanity.
Therefore, Islamic law denies the notion of stare decisis altogether-human judgment does
not bind later human judgment. But see infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing
'AbuSulayman's lawyerly-in a Western sense-narrowing of the legal obligation imposed
by the siyar).
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over the lifetime of the Prophet. Earlier revelations must, there-
fore, be understood in light of later ones. The effort of determining
what God, through naskh, had declared the law to be is one of the
major tasks offiqh. In this way, a relatively determinate body of
rules was created, but at the cost of flexibility. 'AbuSulayman
maintains thatfiqh has tended to read more naskh, more narrow-
ing, into later revelations than was necessary or correct, therefore
producing an overly restrictive Islamic law. By restricting the
scope of naskh, 'AbuSulayman presents, or, more accurately, re-
presents various possibilities foreclosed by the incremental process
of specification which centuries of Islamic scholarship had
undertaken.
The second flaw that 'AbuSulayman finds with fiqh is the failure
to consider context in the interpretation of ahadith, the reports of
the sayings or doings of the Prophet.70 Ahadith fall into two peri-
ods, those which took place when the Prophet and his companions
were in Mecca, and those which took place after the flight to
Medina. The ahadith vary in tone, character, and content; the
problems confronted by Muhammed as leader of the Muslim com-
munity in Mecca were different from those confronted by the
Prophet in Medina. In Mecca, the Muslims were a relatively small
community, and the ahadith are concerned primarily with
problems of the faith and internal relations. During the Medinan
years, the Muslim political and military expansion began, and
Muhammed was confronted by problems of rule. In interpreting
the Meccan and Medinan periods in terms of the different political
needs faced by the Muslim community, 'AbuSulayman emphasizes
the context of decisions taken by the Prophet or the companions.
By focussing on the context, 'AbuSulayman limits the applicability
of the texts. Each decision does not represent a general rule, but a
particular response to a specific set of circumstances. The general
result of this method is that the ahadith of the Meccan period,
many of which could not serve the requirements of the Muslim
imperium in Medina and were hence eschewed, are again made
available.
Both of these intellectual reformulations, the restriction of naskh
and the insistence on context, make shari'a generally, and the siyar
in particular, both a more flexible and less binding legal tradition.
70. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at 66-69, 92-105.
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To the Western observer, the reforms proposed by 'AbuSulayman
may seem rather unobjectionable, no more than a broadening of
interpretive modes and a sensible examination of the facts of a situ-
ation. But the ahadith are a form of revelation; their authority is
second only to the direct revelation of the Qur'an. At the same
time, the ahadith are also human reports, and as such, are fallible.
Stories are mistold, misremembered, misunderstood, and so forth.
The science of fiqh exists in order to separate the truth-God's
message-from human error and misleading circumstance. God
has provided guidance; man's task is to discern the path among the
tangle of his own confusion. Similarly, 'AbuSulayman's willingness
to reinterpret in light of context, and, particularly, to limit the
authority of ahadith to historical circumstances that no longer
exist, may be seen to verge on a denial of the atemporal, and hence
a denial of the contemporary authority of the ahadith. The flexibil-
ity and range of application for shari'a sought by 'AbuSulayman
come dear; the price is the diminution of the sense that human law
is directly connected with divine sovereignty. 'AbuSulayman's
attempt to reform fiqh and so broaden shari'a is a confinement of
one of the major aspirations of Islamic thought.7"
Third, 'AbuSulayman claims that fiqh is flawed because it is
insufficiently empirical; he believes thatfiqh must become empirical
if it is to respond to modem circumstances.7 2 'AbuSulayman uses
"empirical' in at least two senses. First, he alleges that the practi-
tioners of fiqh have traditionally ignored the present and focused
exclusively on the past. An empirical approach would validate
contemporary experience, and thereby palliate the unease many
Muslims feel with modernity. Second, however, 'AbuSulayman
intendsfiqh to be empirical in the scientific sense: inducing general
truths from the accumulation of particular data. Again, 'AbuSu-
layman seeks to create an Islamic modernity. He hopes to place
modern science within the ambit of Islamic culture. If Islamic
scholarship and scholarship in the natural world were both empiri-
cal, then the idea that science and its product-the West's techno-
logical modernity-are Western would be defeated, and with it, its
corollary-the idea that Muslims are unable to join wholeheartedly
the modem world.
71. This is the aspiration that Vogel calls metaordering.
72. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at 76-81.
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Islam is a this-worldly religion, but like all religions, Islam
requires sensitivity to ultimate questions, to the purposes and ends
of things. Since Galileo, modem science has declared such ques-
tions outside its purview, and has defined itself in large part
through a renunciation of teleology. It is difficult to imagine an
Islamic empiricism that renounced all consideration of purpose; it
is difficult to imagine a rapprochement between Islam and scientific
empiricism any closer than that between Christianity and scientific
empiricism. In fine, to shift religious emphasis from past to present
experience does not suffice to make religion scientific.
The lack of a systematic approach to Islamic law is the fourth
and final failing of fiqh.7 3 To remedy this failing, 'AbuSulayman
proposes to weld the fruits of this empiricism and a more flexible
historical exegesis into a rational system. 'AbuSulayman attempts
to render shari'a-a collection of narratives-a social science. 4
Unfortunately, 'AbuSulayman does not explain, much less detail,
how he expects the narrative understanding of shari'a to become
the schematic understanding of contemporary social sciences.
'AbuSulayman also fails to help the Western reader to resolve the
enormous epistemological problems entailed in his proposals to
make Islamic law more empirical and more systematic. In short,
the third and fourth flaws, and 'AbuSulayman's remedies, do not
seem as deeply considered as the thoughts on the appropriate treat-
ment of usul al-fiqh. Taken as whole, 'AbuSulayman's program is
unconvincing.75 Yet its basic impulse, to redirect the focus of
Islamic legal thought from the past to the present, is centrally
important, and will be discussed in greater detail below.
Having established his method, in the final part of his work
'AbuSulayman moves "From Legalistic to Political Thought."
76
He tackles several traditional, albeit difficult, problems of Islamic
international law, including treatment of prisoners and extreme
actions (terror). Each problem was confronted and resolved in the
siyar. Traditionally, the resolution reached in the siyar was binding
73. Id. at 81-83.
74. If one focuses on aspiration rather than diction, this project is reminiscent of the
American Legal Realists.
75. Perhaps no rational program, nothing shy of a new revelation, could be convincing.
However, if 'AbuSulayman frames the problem in terms of rationalistic discourse, he must
confront rationalistic quibbles.
76. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29, at 91-148.
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on future generations-it represented Islamic teaching on the mat-
ter. For 'AbuSulayman, however, each solution is revealed to be a
particular instance, understandable only in the context of political
contingency, not of legal obligation. The areas of conflict between
siyar and the modem law of war and human rights are thus
explained away. Free of legal obligation, Muslims are at liberty to
implement pragmatic and humane politics.
'AbuSulayman closes with a lengthy discussion of the way in
which implementation of the new Islamic approach can lead to a
just world order.77 To simplify, he claims that politics (associated
with the cultural flexibility necessary for participation in the mod-
em world) can and should replace law (associated with the con-
straints of tradition). For 'AbuSulayman, politics denotes freedom
to act, and law entails restraint, the imposition of authority. His
move from law to politics is thus a liberation intended to free Mus-
lim societies to assume their place in the modem world.
'AbuSulayman elides rather than articulates the problem of
authority. On one hand, the transition from traditional to modem
societies does not entail the replacement of law by polities. Con-
temporary societies, including the international one, frequently
require the relative determinacy and stability of law. The need for
law entails the need for authority; law without authority is mean-
ingless. On ihe other hand, politics requires authority just as much
as law does. The political realm must have authority in order to
issue law, and to shape future political action. In fine, the need for
law, and hence the need for authority, is perennial, and the realm of
freedom suggested by 'AbuSulayman, polities, also requires author-
ity. The problem of authority is thus inescapable. The problem is
sharpened for the Muslim because polities, no less than law, is an
exercise of temporal power in a world of divine sovereignty; there-
fore political action, no less than legal action, is accountable before
ultimate authority.
'AbuSulayman's book fails to provide an accounting of Islamic
authority; it does not construct legal or political prescriptions on
substantively Islamic ground. 'AbuSulayman sticks with the
Islamic source, and in that sense remains Islamic.7 But having
undercut the practical authority of Islamic scholarship, if not the
77. Id. at 116-48.
78. He also remains limited to the subjects handled within the traditional sources.
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Qur'an itself, he provides no substitute source of legitimacy. While
'AbuSulayman's efforts are undoubtedly clever, one is left wonder-
ing how compelling this project could be to an audience that
demanded an Islamic polity.
For Muslim intellectuals confronting public international law,
the devil's choice is posed: either adopt the culture of the West, and
lose one's culture and thus oneself, or renounce the culture of the
West, and lose one's role in the modern world. The Muslim is
placed at a crossroads. To take one road is to abandon the other.
An-Na'im grasps the nettle of modernity in another way."'
Modernity and Islam are truths that require one another, are com-
plements rather than alternatives. An-Na'im attempts to under-
stand modernity in a religious fashion, and to make his religion,
Islam, modern:
The aim of this book is to contribute to the process of
changing Muslim perceptions, attitudes, and policies on
Islamic and not secular grounds. Unless a religiously
acceptable case for genuine modernist reform is estab-
lished, present and future Muslims face only two alterna-
tives: either to implement the public law of Shari'a,
despite its inadequacies and problems, or to abandon it in
favor of secular public law. I find neither alternative sat-
isfactory, and I hope to reconcile Muslim commitment to
Islamic law with the achievement of the benefits of secu-
larism within a religious framework.80
The attempt to reinvent Islam requires a critical endeavor: the
introduction of doubt into current structures of belief. An-Na'im
79. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward an Islamic Reformation (1990).
80. Id. at 10. As a friendly commentator remarks, An-Na'im attempts to resolve the
dilemma facing contemporary Muslims by restructuring their understanding of Islam itself-
[This book] represents a radical departure from both the Islamic modernist and
the Islamic fundamentalist positions which dominate contemporary thought in
the Muslim world. It is neither an attempt to integrate Western and traditional
Islamic thought (as is usually the case with modernist positions) nor a
fundamentalist effort to return to pristine principles. An-Na'im is attempting to
transform the understanding of the very foundations of Islamic law, not to reform
them.
John 0. Voll, Foreword to An-Na'im, id. at x. While An-Na'im's project is obviously
grounded in deep belief, Voll's foreword makes its heterodox character clear. I cannot
speak to how widely An-Na'im diverges from the main currents of Islamic thought, or the
extent to which the heterodox character of his effort precludes its political success.
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thus begins by adopting a strategy familiar from 'AbuSulayman
and other modernists:
Shari'a is not the whole of Islam but instead is an inter-
pretation of its fundamental sources as understood in a
particular historical context. Once it is appreciated that
Shari'a was constructed by its founding jurists, it should
become possible to think about reconstructing certain
aspects of Shari'a, provided that such reconstruction is
based on the same fundamental sources of Islam and is
fully consistent with its essential moral and religious
precepts.
1
In this passage, shari'a is identified withfiqh, an interpretive, and
hence backward looking derivation of authority from legal texts to
answer contemporary questions. Fiqh, then, is identified with a
scholastic class, the "founding jurists," whose work has been over-
taken by history. An-Na'im thus recharacterizes shari'a, and pro-
duces an idea of Islamic law much more akin to Western positivist
ideas of law as ajuristic structure, formulated to meet certain social
exigencies.
Once shari'a has been deinoted from its status as the path of
God, as the social reality of the whole of Islam, then it is possible to
counterpoise shari'a, as a social system, with other social systems:
In order to demonstrate the need for drastic reform of
Shari'a in these fields [including international law], I
explain what may be taken to be imperative principles in
the particular field, contrasting them with the corre-
sponding principles and rules of Shari'a, and highlighting
the prospects of reconciliation, whether within or from
outside Shar'a, but always in accordance with Islamic
precepts.
82
The "drastic reform of Shari'a" is thus to be guided by two sets of
standards, the "imperative principles in the field" and "Islamic
precepts." The tension between the two sets of standards is consid-
erable. Why should the imperative principles of a field be privi-
leged over the teaching of shari'a? God orders shari'a, but who
81. An-Na'im, supra note 79, at xiv.
82. Id. at xiv-xv.
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gives these other orders?83 From literally the first sentence of the
book, An-Na'im posits two sources of authority, Islam and, for
lack of a more precise term, what might be called secular moder-
nity. Toward an Islamic Reformation can be understood as an
attempt to build a politics that will accommodate both authorities:
Muslim peoples of the world are entitled to exercise their
legitimate collective right to self-determination in terms
of an Islamic identity, including the application of Islamic
law, if they wish to do so, provided that they do not vio-
late the legitimate right of self-determination of individu-
als and groups both within and outside the Muslim
communities.
84
The tension between Islam and secular modernity within An-
Na'im's proposal for reform of shari'a also appears in his discussion
of the self-determination of Muslim communities. What is the rela-
tionship between Islam and the legitimacy that underlies the "col-
lective right to self-determination"? For Muslim peoples, the
legitimacy of the collective right to self-determination lacks the
divine legitimacy endowed by Islamic identity. Muslims have not
only a right but an obligation to live according to Islam. However,
An-Na'im suggests that the legitimacy of the collective right to self-
determination is prior to Islamic identity, both because it is pos-
sessed by peoples who do not (yet) recognize Allah, and because
even Muslims must respect the right to self-determination of non-
Muslim peoples.
A similar tension between Islam and the concerns of modernity
arises in the application of shari'a to contemporary societies.
Shari'a cannot simply be imposed on the conditions of modern life;
to attempt to do so would only result in massive human suffering.
"[T]he application of the public law of Shari'a today will be
counterproductive and detrimental to Muslims and to Islam itself"
because "the public law of Shari'a is fundamentally inconsistent
with the realities of modern life." 5 Nonetheless, An-Na'im firmly
maintains that pure secularism is neither possible nor desirable.
"[I]f we are to understand anything at all about what has happened
in the past and is happening today in the Muslim world, we must
83. One might also ask, what are Islamic precepts as distinguished from shari'a?
84. An-Na'im, supra note 79, at 1.
85. Id. at 187.
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appreciate the universality and centrality of religion as a factor in
the lives of the Muslim peoples."
'8 6
The topics touched on here, An-Na'im's proposal for a reform of
shari'a, the self-determination of Muslim communities, and the
application of shari'a to modem life, all illustrate the profound and
multi-faceted tension between the two authorities, Islam and secu-
lar modernity. An-Na'im tries to restructure the authority of
Islam, by "evolv[ing] an alternative and modem conception of
Islamic public law that can resolve"87 the tensions between (tradi-
tional) Islam and modernity. If Islam can be reformed, re-
imagined, then perhaps it will serve as a complement, rather than
an opponent, to secular modernity.
An-Na'im makes two basic choices at the outset of his legal ref-
ormation. First, rather than redefine secular modernity, An-Na'im
attempts to change Muslims' approach to Islam. An-Na'im thus
eschews fundamentalism, which holds fast to a pure and therefore
stable Islam, and reforms society within the mold offered by eternal
Islam. He also avoids secularism, which asserts that Islam is irrele-
vant for the tasks of modernity. 88 'AbuSulayman believes those
tasks should be undertaken by the inhabitants of Muslim countries.
An-Na'im asserts that life in Muslim countries is essentially
Islamic, but he also assumes modernity, and attempts to reform
Islam.8 9 Second, and more technically, An-Na'im limits the scope
of shari'a in order to create the space within which to rearticulate
an Islamic vision of contemporary social arrangements. 90 Shari'a is
a juristic construct distinct from revelation, a construction legally
valid for, and understandable only in terms of, the circumstances of
its creation. In restricting the scope of shari'a, An-Na'im turns
away from the intellectual tradition of reformers, including
'AbuSulayman and stretching back through Muhammad ibn Abd
al-Wahab to Ibn Taymiyya, who tend to make shari'a more appli-
cable to daily life by increasing its scope and flexibility.9 For An-
86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 2.
88. Id. at 48.
89. Id. at 67-68.
90. Id. at 68.
91. For a vivid, if not very enthusiastic, short review of the importance ofr bn Tamiyya
and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab, see Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic
Theology and Law 240-45 (Andras and Ruth Hamori trans., 1981) (1910). The work of
these reformers illustrates, inter alia, that many of the concerns that emerge in regard to
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Na'im, shari'a is to be narrowed in its authority, not broadened in
its application. In the space uncovered by shari'a, a modem Mus-
lim way of life may germinate and flourish.
Even though they reach opposite conclusions regarding the scope
of shari'a, An-Na'im's and 'AbuSulayman's arguments share a cru-
cial similarity: an emphasis on the present nature of religious expe-
rience. In so doing they hearken to the tradition of Islamic reform
stretching back to the Hanbali reformer Ibn Taymiyya. "Ibn
Taymiyya, even more than other Hanbalis, waged open war on taq-
lid. To him blind adherence to the views of men, rather than fresh
resort to the wellsprings of God-given truth in the Qur'an and
sunna, was vital error."92 In the same vein, 'AbuSulayman argues
that the practitioner of fiqh must take account of history, of poli-
tics, and of particular circumstances before a teaching may be
derived. To the essentially secular Western view, 'AbuSulayman
may seem to be simply substituting the views of contemporary men
for the traditions of dead men. But these reformers are all pious
men, and believe that Islam must take account of the present, and
cannot continue to locate authority and righteousness solely in the
past. Contemporary Islamic life requires present interpretational
rigor, combined with an iron-willed fidelity to its results.93
An-Na'im stresses the present quality of religious experience,
and hence Islamic authority, more than 'AbuSulayman does. An-
Na'im is more sensitive than 'AbuSulayman; An-Na'im explicitly
acknowledges the "exceedingly delicate" nature of his undertak-
ing.94 The proposals of both 'AbuSulayman and An-Na'im are del-
icate because they concern the basis for legal authority, the
mainspring of the law. Stated theologically, both arguments touch
on the object of piety itself. 'AbuSulayman's argument draws
international law can also be discussed under other rubrics. A more compendious
approach than the one I have undertaken would attempt to relate Muslim thinking about
international law to Muslim thinking about law generally, about modernity, about
democracy, and so forth. For a discussion of 'AbuSulayman's broadening of shari'a, see
supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
92. Vogel, supra note 6, at 166.
93. A reformer who calls for religious renewal is inevitably vulnerable to charges that he
disregards established authority, and that in denouncing the false authorities between the
reformer and the well-springs of the faith, the reformer is only demonstrating his own ego.
Al-Wahab was executed as a heretic. While certainly not heterodox, neither Ibn Tamiyya
nor 'AbuSulayman is in the orthodox mainstream.
94. An-Na'im, supra note 79, at xiii.
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much of its authority from implicit reliance on the power of moder-
nity, lent teeth by technology, that is inevitably understood to be
Western and hence foreign to Muslims. In order to respond to the
new world, 'AbuSulayman would redefine shari'a as politics. But
he does little to legitimate politics Islamically other than to assert
its necessity for Muslims.
In contrast, An-Na'im's argument is more pious. It draws much
more of its authority from Islamic sources, the Qur'an and sunna.
An-Na'im leaves shari'a with the status of law insofar as it is based
on the Qur'an and sunna. The activity of the jurist is to interpret
shari'a, and to study Qur'an and sunna, in light of historical con-
text. Because it was written for an entirely different world, the
siyar does not need to be reinterpreted, but largely abandoned as a
guide to the conduct of international affairs. Today's Muslims
must look not to the siyar, but to Islam itself for guidance:
Rather, since the use of force was justified by the histori-
cal context of violent intercommunal and international
relations, it must cease to be so justified in the present
context, in which peaceable coexistence has become a
vital necessity for the survival of humanity. Besides the
growing trend toward an enlightened view of human rela-
tions and in favor of peace, modern means of nuclear war-
fare have made hostile international relations
unthinkable. It is true that limited use and threat of force
are still practiced in international relations. The question
is whether they should continue to be the basis of interna-
tional law. I think it cannot possibly be.9"
An-Na'im is not merely arguing from mundane necessity or util-
ity, maslaha. His argument is that historical context is the way in
which Muslims live Islam, and that Islam is not opposed to history,
but rather suffuses history. Consequently, Islamic thought must
take place in the context of historical understanding:
[flor Muslims the historical context, as such, can neither
be the source of Shari'a in the past nor its source in the
future.... Islamic law in the past, present, and future
must be based on the Qur'an and Sunna. I fully accept
this position and only wish to suggest that the historical
95. Id. at 143.
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context is merely the framework for the interpretation and
application of these basic sources of Islam.... [I]t is not
suggested here that Islamic law should simply follow the
developments in human history regardless of the provi-
sions of the Qur'an and Sunna... .. [T]he Qur'an and
Sunna have been the source of Shari'a as the Islamic
response to the concrete realities of the past and must be
the source of modem Shari'a as the Islamic response to
the concrete realities of today.
96
An-Na'im argues that contemporary circumstances require a
Meccan version of Islam, and provides an internally authoritative
argument for the Meccan authorities. The ahadith of the Meccan
period, for An-Na'im, are a series of testaments, revelations of
teachings for which the umma and the world-mired in continual
violence-were not yet ready. Such a world, and the expansion and
rule of the Islamic empire, required a sterner code. That code was
provided by the Prophet's teachings at Medina. But throughout
and ever since the years of empire, the teachings of Mecca have
stood in wait for a civilization that could be more gentle.97 We
have now achieved a level of civilization that has the potential to
fulfill the commands of Mecca, and in so doing, to be truly humane.
At international law, asserts An-Na'im, we should abandon the
power politics of imperial Islam discussed in the Medinan tradition
and return to the Mecca which provides the model for a humane
international polity.98
96. Id. at 143-44.
97. Abdulaziz Sachedina disputes the dichotomy drawn between Meccan and Medinan
tradition, and argues that at least one of the strands of Islamic thought generally regarded
as progressive (e.g., the verse, "there is no compulsion in religion") are Medinan, not
Meccan in origin. Abdulaziz Sachedina, Review of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward
an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law, 25 Int'l J.
Middle E. Stud. 155, 156 (1993).
98. I am in no position to comment on how persuasive this argument is to Muslims,
other than to say that it is the kind of argument, because openly purposive, that is required.
Abdulaziz Sachedina argues that the epistemology of An-Na'im is unlikely to persuade
devout Muslims, and is unlikely to be understood by Westerners. Id. at 157. Still, An-
Na'im is operating with far and away the most sophisticated epistemology of the scholars
surveyed here. He is also operating with a true religious vision, which I have stated here a
bit more explicitly than he does, no doubt at the cost of oversimplification. The title of An-
Na'im's book, Toward an Islamic Reformation, is intriguing. Although differences
abound, the analogies between his project and Luther's (such as the rediscovery of basic
texts, Qur'an, sunna, and sola scriptura; radical reductions of the binding quality of the old
law; and radical revitalization of the religious quality in contemporary life, including law)
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I introduced this survey of Islamic perspectives on international
law in terms of three oppositions: peace and war, dar al-islam and
dar al-harb, Islamic authority and Western category. Each of the
scholars cursorily surveyed here points out, in more or less explicit
fashion, that the acceptance of warfare which characterized Islam
at certain periods in its history cannot be maintained in the present.
Similarly, the violent intolerance of non-Muslim views, the desire
to spread the faith by the sword if need be, and the aspiration to
overrun the dar al-harb and establish the universal umma cannot
be maintained in the contemporary world. The publicists of
Islamic international law, like their counterparts in public interna-
tional law, begin with a preoccupation with warfare and a desire to
use law in order to achieve peace. In public international law, war-
fare is consigned to the past; law ignores history and hopes to estab-
lish, through negotiation, a better future. In Islamic law, where
history is both legally authoritative and violent, the relationship
between law and history is much more problematic. If the Muslim
tradition is simply accepted, a great deal of violence must be
accepted as well. But insofar as the tradition is distanced, legal
authority-revealed to the Prophet, and the tool with which peace
is to be achieved-seems to be weakened. To schematize the prob-
lem: there can be no peace for Islam without Islamic law; there can
be no Islamic law without history; and Islamic history is largely the
history of a people at war.
For all of these scholars, the result of this quandary is an obses-
sion with history, an attempt to show that, although it is steeped in
violence, Islamic history does provide authority for a peaceful
are powerful. Cf. Harold J. Berman & John Witte, Jr., The Transformation of Western
Legal Philosophy in Lutheran Germany, 62 S. Cal. L Rev. 1575 (1989) (remarking that
Lutheran legal philosophy is an important source of both natural law theory and legal
positivism, two competing schools of contemporary western legal philosophy). These
scholars suggest that Luther provides, at least conceptually, the possibility of a Western
political vision different from, and perhaps more deeply meaningful than, rationalist
liberalism. By showing us elements of Western culture that have been obscured by the
glare of the Enlightenment, revisionist thinking about Martin Luther may make two
contributions to the concerns of this Article. It may help Westerners understand Islamic
attitudes toward international law. As interestingly, re-asking the questions so important
to Islam, and apparently to Luther also, about the relationship between belief and politics
may give shape to the widespread and rather inchoate discontent among Western
commentators with contemporary liberalism, including the liberalism that informs public
international law.
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world order.99 Each scholar is concerned with the basic problem of
the siyar: the relationship of the state to warfare as defined by the
siyar. Each scholar attempts to refute claims, derived from plausi-
ble readings of the siyar, that Muslims are obliged to violence in the
name of the faith. Each insists, conversely, that Islamic tradition
provides some authority for peaceful relations between the dar al-
harb and the dar al-islam. Most of these scholars devote considera-
ble energy to developing methodologies that allow such conclu-
sions, conclusions different from those reached by a simple reading
of the siyar. These methodologies, however, are partial rather than
compelling justifications. Each scholar seems satisfied to refute a
claim that Shaybmani's siyar should apply. Each makes essentially
negative arguments, presumably directed against a Muslim ortho-
doxy and perhaps also the Western Orientalists, who both generally
hold that the Islamic law of nations is contained in the orthodox
reading of the siyar.
For those of us outside the Muslim world, for whom Shaybani is
anything but an obvious source of law, a more affirmative approach
to legal argument is necessary. Most of these scholars tell us little
about how or why their own conclusions are reached. What is
Islamic international law? Why is it Islamic? The scholars sur-
veyed here do not answer these basic questions. In order to move
from war to peace, and to avoid conflict between the dar al-harb
and the dar al-islam, the third opposition, Islamic authority and
Western category, is essentially left unconsidered. Where the law is
substantive, and clearly Islamic-for instance in discussions of the
applicability of the siyar-Muslim commentary rests upon Islamic
authority. But where the law deals with Western categories, the
scholars make no effort to establish Islamic authority, beyond argu-
ing that their position is not forbidden by the siyar. These scholars
produce a modern theory of international law, i.e., one not much
different from public international law, by rendering conceptual
categories increasingly Western and by failing to locate authority in
99. This is the root of the odd, yet common, comparisons between Islamic history and
the history of violence, injustice, and lawlessness in the West. See, e.g., Enayat, supra note
36. The argument is that if the West, with its bloody history, can have international law,
then so can Islam. The argument fails, and attracts almost no attention, because the West
does not use history as a self-conscious mode of legal justification. The U.N. is justified in
spite of, as a response to, World War II, not through World War II. For a discussion of
history as a source of justification see infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
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a specifically Islamic reality. The Islamic discussion of interna-
tional law is radically incomplete because it fails to be substantively
Islamic.
Islamic international law is also topically incomplete. If interna-
tional law is conflated with the law in and of war, how does one
deal with a trade questionlco The binomial world of the jus ad
bellum engenders (and is engendered by) the division of humanity
into friends and foes, into the dar al-harb and the dar al-islam. The
binomial world of the authors surveyed is generally revealed
through copious discussion of "The West." This preoccupation is
simple, alien, and, at worst, violent. What about peaceful relations
with non-Muslim states? The most these texts argue is that such
relations are possible. However, merely to show that relations are
possible, or permitted, does not constitute a theory of law. Con-
sider, for instance, resource extraction by a technologically sophis-
ticated state from a poor state. What obligations to share or to
protect intellectual property, if any, arise from such a relationship?
What is the Islamic position on relations between Islamic states
and the rest of the developing world, which it cannot see within the
neo-colonial lexicon with which it often describes relations with
developed nations? Most obviously, how are the affairs among
Muslim states to be regulated? What do any of these texts say
about the problem of Egyptian migrant labor in Kuwait?
An Islamic theory of international law must confront these ques-
tions. A body of law, whether considered as an academic corpus or
as the web of actual application, need not be able to answer all the
questions that arise within the frame of its discourse. Law has its
limitations. But a doctrinally adequate structure can locate con-
cerns within the context that gave them voice, and can respond to
those concerns. While definitive answers may not be possible, plau-
sible arguments should be. What these authors present as a theory
of international law is a fragmentary description of certain interna-
tional relations. The drama of the tensions in which Islamic inter-
national law takes place---the horror of war, the radical separation
of the world into the dar al-harb and the dar al-islam, and the
unhappily inchoate relationship between Western categories and
Islamic authorities-blinds scholars of Islamic international law to
100. Moinuddin, supra note 42, at 113-83, does discuss the economic relations among
Islamic states. While his discussion is interesting, it does not seem Islamic.
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the complexity of the world they discuss. Islamic international law
is, at present, incapable of fulfilling its own theoretical imperatives,
of delivering a legalistic account of those aspects of its universe that
are il-defined by the oppositions of peace and war.
Perhaps my criticism unfairly judges Islamic international law
within the context of public international law. Perhaps the project
of Islamic law is not a legal articulation of relationships appropri-
ate to the international environment. If so, one is driven to ask
what the project of Islamic international law is. One answer arises
from an external view of the tensions I have tried to explore from
an internal perspective, as live questions confronting Muslim
jurists: the publicists of Islamic international law exhibit an obses-
sion with the world of Islam and a monolithic world outside; a ten-
dency to explain "Islamic law" within the categories of Western
international law (even using Latin); a predilection to apologize for
the practice of Muslim states, combined with often harsh critiques
of the practice of Western states; the desire to adopt superficially
understood conceptions of Western politics; and the tendency to
give elaborate and tenuous historical arguments for the priority of
something "Islamic" in existing public international law, however
hegemonic and loudly un-Islamic it may currently be. Taken
together, these motifs powerfully suggest to the outside observer
that the project of Islamic international law is nothing more than
an attempt at accommodation, an attempt to articulate an identifi-
ably Islamic response-even if is not Islamically authoritative-to
the public international law regime. To oversimplify for the sake of
clarity: there is no Islamic international law, only Islamic commen-
tary on international law.
Although tempting, such a view is too simple: Islamic commen-
tary on international law is not difficult to provide. Like any great
religious, moral, and intellectual tradition, Islam affords a perspec-
tive from which one may comment on politics. The scholars sur-
veyed here seem to be searching for something much deeper and
more difficult than a perspective from which to comment. They
search for the authority with which commentary, cultural opinion,
becomes law. They seem to have accepted the categories of inter-
national law. The task is to provide an Islamic content for those
categories. Perhaps the need for Islamic authority reflects the
devout Muslim's belief that only God is sovereign, and so only
Islam is authoritative. And perhaps the categories of public inter-
[Vol. 33:819
ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
national law are recognized as empty, and therefore in need of
authority.
I. ISLAMIC LAw AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COGNITIVE DIFFICULTIES
My argument thus far claims that (1) Islam views public interna-
tional law as a foreign entity, to which a response is necessary, and
(2) Islam has set itself the task of, but as yet has failed in, articulat-
ing an international law. Is an Islamic international law possible?
To approach this difficult and open-ended question, I will
examine the aspirations of both Islamic international law and pub-
lic international law. Although Islamic international law and pub-
lic international law share a superficially similar desire for global
justice, the constitutive elements of the two discourses are different.
Islamic international law focuses on the individual, the believer,
and public international law is built around institutions, principally
the state. The ways in which these constitutive elements relate, the
structures of what both cultures call law, are also profoundly differ-
ent. Finally, the way in which law is pronounced-the ossification
of cultural authority into the skeleton of politics-is conceived of in
profoundly different ways.101
The Islamic authors surveyed here understand international law
in absolute terms, as a justifiable universal public order of relations
among states. The current international order may therefore only
aspirationally be understood as legal, since it only aspires to justice.
In actual practice, so-called international law is revealed to articu-
late the will of the powerful. For example, "[t]he Western tradition
of thought in the field of international law or world order is
extremely poor," and "[t]here is a great need of the world today for
an international order which would establish a just and permanent
peace without tyranny."102 True international law would be uni-
101. By "different" I do not mean simply different from the views held by Western
theorists of international law. I mean a difference more profound than that between
developed and developing states, or between capitalist and Marxist states. While anti-
colonial and Marxist views have influenced the Islamic discourse on international relations,
I believe that specifically Islamic thinking on international law is radically different from,
and not to be compared with, the relatively internal critiques of international law so
prevalent in the days of the New International Economic Order and a viable Marxism.
102. al-Faruqi, supra note 67, at xxi-xxiii; see also Hamidullah, supra note 14, at 17
('Muslim International Law would aim at the justest possible conduct of the Muslim ruler
in his international intercourse.").
1993]
860 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
versal as well as just. Although public international law claims to
be potentially universal, limited only by the accession of states,
Islam is already universal as God's revealed truth.10 3 There can be
only one set of universal explanations, and so the only true interna-
tional law is Islamic. The universalism of Islamic international law
is deeper as well as broader than that of public international law.
Islamic international law, like all Islamic law, has a substantive
aspiration: to realize the command of God, shari'a. The shari'a is
addressed to, expressed by, and lived through the umma, the com-
munity of believers. Unlike the aggregate of individuals presumed
by liberalism, and so by public international law, the umma is a
community, held together by shared belief. Islamic international
law thus ultimately aspires to global community, aspires to be the
vehicle through which Islam becomes the world, through which the
babble of humanity becomes the umma.' °4
This millenarian vision is hardly useful for the non-Muslim, and
provides little sense of what, short of the establishment of the uni-
versal umma, Muslims expect from international law. Islamic
law's millenarian vision itself impedes answers to more limited
questions. As in the application of the shari'a to municipal law,
which many Muslims insist has never really been tried, the failings
of the international legal regime can always be excused as the fail-
ures of an imperfect realization of Islam. The prevalence of such
failures, from the death of the Prophet on (the right-guided Caliphs
seemed to have had problems with just this issue of violence and
the state), is irrelevant. Even among reformers, a frequent response
to failure is a more perfect Islam, indeed, the Islamization of
103. But see Schacht, supra note 7, at 199 ("Islamic law does not claim universal
validity; it is binding for the Muslim to its full extent in the territory of the Islamic state, to
a slightly lesser extent in enemy territory, and for the non-Muslim only to a limited extent
in Islamic territory."). Schacht claims that "Islamic law is conscious of its character as a
religious ideal," id., but, considered as an ideal, Islamic law is already universal.
104. Lest I be read as alarmist, let me quickly add that public international law has
similarly boundless aspirations to mass conversion. Such aspirations may not even be
consciously held, but appear to be built into the structure of relations among liberal states.
See Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), in Perpetual
Peace and Other Essays (T. Humphrey trans., 1983). This thesis has received considerable
attention of late among international law scholars. See Fernando R. Tes6n, The Kantian
Theory of International Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1573 (1992); Anne-Marie Burley, Law
Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum.
L. Rev. 1907 (1992).
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knowledge itself,105 or a return to the true Islam of Qur'an and
Sunna.106 Islamic international law works directly towards the ide-
als of justice, the universal umma, and the realization of divine will;
these are its predicate, its justification, and its desire. The task-
the hard work-of creating an Islamic international law is thus
deferred, and Islamic international law remains necessary but
unstarted. Each of the works surveyed here is highly preliminary, a
defense of the idea of Islamic international law rather than an expli-
cation of Islamic views of a particular, relatively focused topic. °0
Khadduri, who tends to minimize conflicts between Western
international law and Islamic international law, provides a few
more modest Islamic hopes for international law. He expects the
Islamic law of nations to make certain contributions to a truly
international law. The substance of those contributions is
revealing: "Since Islam recognizes the individual as a subject of its
international law, Muslims would welcome the adoption of such a
principle in the modem law of nations.... [I]n a shrinking world
the individual's claim to a modem law of nations has become a
pressing necessity."10 8 In public international law, as most for-
mally and austerely defined, the relation between the state and the
individual is irrelevant. Although it may have served heuristic pur-
poses, this hard line has probably never been an adequate descrip-
tion of international law, and the utility of the definition has been
eroded by twentieth century developments, notably the establish-
ment of human rights law. Nonetheless, the position of the individ-
ual at public international law has always been and remains
ambiguous. Sovereignty rests with states, and only states have an
inherent, non-derivative power to bind themselves internationally.
International legislation is thus the purview of states. More gener-
ally, although public international law increasingly recognizes a
105. 'AbuSulayman, supra note 29.
106. An-Na'im, supra note 79. I am being a bit unfair to An-Na'im, because he is right
in insisting that reform must be both pious and active.
107. Moinuddin, supra note 42, is a partial exception. The first section of his book is a
general defense of the possibility of Islamic law. After that, however, he narrows his
attention to a single document, the charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(oIc).
108. Khadduri, The Islamic System, supra note 26, at 52. Khadduri is correct in
maintaining that public international law needs to account for the individual as the
emergence of human rights law testifies; but the extent to which the particularistic concerns
of classical Islamic learning can facilitate that effort requires more than suggestion.
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wide range of actors, in a profound sense it remains the discourse of
states, and those actors appear on the international legal stage as
the result of agreement among states. The legal role of individuals
at international law is thus derivative, like the light of the moon.
For Islam, however, God is sovereign, and the legal position of
individuals is no more derivative than that of states. Islamic inter-
national law therefore has no conceptual difficulty with an interna-
tional law regarding human rights, or the nationalization of private
assets, to name two areas where public international law theorists
have had difficulty articulating the role of the individual on the
international plane.
"The second point which Muslim jurists might stress is that
moral principles, apart from religious doctrine, should not be com-
pletely divorced from the system of law governing nations." 109 The
alignment of politics with a moral order has two aspects, an institu-
tional and a personal. Institutionally, if God is sovereign, if justice
is universal, then the morality that applies to individuals could also
apply to states. By providing a standard with which to judge states,
Islam could remedy an oft-remarked failing of public international
law, its moral sterility." ' Individually, even personally, the provi-
sion of a moral order might also provide public international law
with a sense of authenticity. Islamic authority is based on God's
plan. Because the source of authority is always the same, Islam
locates the individual vis-A-vis all temporal authorities in the same
way. In contrast, liberal political structures like public interna-
tional law, in which political authority is based on the consent of
the governed, have difficulty maintaining their authority as the size
of the polity increases, so that the myth that the individual has
somehow willed the status quo becomes impossible to sustain. In
the West, this lack of authority is usually expressed as alienation
from politics, a lack of authenticity. The Muslim, however, does
not will the status quo; he recognizes the plan of God. Although
109. Id. Again, I find Khadduri's contention substantively correct but perhaps
technically naive. Khadduri goes on to attempt to show, somewhat unconvincingly in an
Islamic context, that "moral" does not imply "religious."
110. The sterility of public international law to which I refer is essentially a malaise in
modern political thought which is frequently expressed as an attack on liberalism, For
examples in the context of public international law, see David Kennedy, A New Stream of
International Legal Scholarship, 7 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1, 133 (1988); Martti Koskenniemi, From
Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989).
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the plan of God, even as revealed in the right international order,
may be vast, it is not alienating.
The articulation of a role for the individual and the provision of a
moral experience of law are different aspects of Islam's constitution
of legal meaning. Meaning, human significance, is the promise that
Islam holds for public international law. Islamic international law
unifies global law and individual conscience, legal obligation and
moral imperative, by viewing the entire political structure through
a unifying moral vision. Islam bids to dissolve the bounds between
form and content, process and substance, theory and experience,
which so characterize public international law and so disappoint.
Like Islamic international law, public international law aspires to
global order. However, the two laws deploy profoundly different
strategies for the realization of their aspirations. As with all liberal
structures, consent is the central source of authority in public inter-
national law. The substance of public international law is the
accretion of institutional consent, and the vital activity in interna-
tional law is the structuring of consensual processes-processes
which will give rise to law. Public international law thus derives its
legitimacy, its quality as legal, not from its concordance with the
right order of things, but from its production by appropriate
processes."1  Definition in terms of process liberates public inter-
national law from many demands imposed both by the world (effi-
cacy) and by aspiration (justice). The speakers in the
conversations that comprise international law are mediating struc-
tures, institutions, most importantly, nation-states.112 Consensual
discourse is about its speakers, and only tangentially about the
topic at hand.' 1 3 Rather than speak to the particular facts of social
reality, or to some universal notion of justice, international law is
primarily the discourse of institutions with each other about each
other. Public international law is institutionally self-contained, the
111. Positivists hold this is the definition of law per se, an understandable overstatement.
I would argue that the ideology, and identity, of public international law remains
essentially positivist. Although positivism is increasingly unfashionable in United States
and European jurisprudential circles, it remains the jurisprudential core of actual legal
training in Europe, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in the United States.
112. The whole importance attached to whether or not the Palestine Liberation
Organization has national status-that is, can represent and bind the Palestinians-
presumes exactly this point.
113. This is the standard critique of liberalism, that it is perpetually condemned to
dither over process, and is unable to speak of substantive matters.
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legal discourse of the global culture with itself. This self-referential
quality provides the great resilience of public international law. We
see this in practice. The ubiquitous examples of the failure to
achieve global justice do not result in exhortations to ignore public
international law and mediate directly between particular condition
and universal aspiration. Instead, the failure of international legal
process gives rise to exhortations for institutions to repeat and
refine the process. Each round of peace talks in the Middle East
occasions more talks; international law is a self-sustaining dis-
course, impervious to the demands of the world or of its own ideals.
Despite its universal aspirations, public international law is a dis-
course locked into the mediate level of politics.'1 4
One might assert, in radical contrast, that Islam is basically sus-
picious of the exercise of power and attempts to excise the mediate
level of politics that is the environment and concern of public inter-
national law. The exercise of politics is likely to be willful and to
involve men in untruth, or rebellion against the divine will. Cer-
tainly a profound discomfort with the business of politics (writ
large) emerges from the following ahadith on judging.'15
The just qadi will be brought on the Judgment Day,
and confronted with such a harsh accounting that he will
wish that he had never judged between any two, even as
to a single date.
One who is appointed judge [qadi] is as slaughtered
without a knife.
Judges are three: two in the fire, and one in Paradise.'
16
If politics itself is suspect, it is difficult to see how political legiti-
114. I do not deny that public international law, for all its claimed devotion to neutral
process, is often suffused with Western substantive values-witness International Monetary
Fund conditionality. But such values are not the terms of discourse, and language is the
matter at hand.
115. Islam often seems to equate politics with judgment. This makes sense: if Islam
understands legitimacy as the congruence of truth and power, it is the act of judgment that
most clearly poses the tension between knowledge and decision.
116. These ahadith are from various sources, reprinted with bibliography in Vogel,
supra note 6, at 138-39 (citations omitted).
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macy could ever arise. As a political enterprise within a culture
hostile to politics, Islamic international law is doomed from the
outset.
While superficially appealing, and containing a core of truth, this
argument is overstated.117 These ahadith are prefatory to an enor-
mous body of wisdom on the practice of judging, on the appropri-
ate conduct for a qadi. The ahadith serve not to discourage or
disparage judges, but to make them aware of the moral gravity of
their task. Furthermore, both the Qur'an and ahadith can be
quoted to show the virtue and necessity of politics.118 "The dearest
of people to God on the Day of Judgment, and seated the closest to
Him, is the just ruler; and the most hateful to God and seated the
furthest from him, is an unjust ruler."119 On the other hand, a
moral awe of politics, even among those intimately associated with
politics, is certainly not unknown in the West.120
Although both Islam and the West are suspicious of political
117. The rest of this Article is an attempt to refine this basic point.
118. I only quote ahadith, reports of the sayings and doings of the Prophet and his
Companions, not the Qur'an. The Qur'an itself refers only to the umma, not the state. On
examination, the Qur'anic attitude toward power is the same as that revealed more directly
in the ahadith. As quotation from the Qur'an would have required lengthy discussion of
the lessons which have been drawn from the passage, I have limited myself to citing an
hadith in order to show that Islam does not simply condemn or avoid politics.
119. Vogel, supra note 6, at 397 (citation omitted).
120. One might recall the third paradox of Plato's Republic, the philosopher who has no
desire to be king, as well as Christ's injunction to judge not, lest ye be judged. But even
practicing judges can be wary of their office. In his diary, the great English judge Sir
Mathew Hale kept a list of Bible quotations that spoke to his vocation. Among them was 2
Chronicles 19:6, "And he said to the judges, take heed what ye do; for yejudge not for man
but for the Lord, who is with you in the judgment." Reprinted in Maija Jansson, Mathew
Hale on Judges and Judging, 9 J. Legal Hist. 201, 204 (1988). Hale noted in his diary,
[Tihe great consideration of all is that which Jehoshaphat puts his judges in mind
of: that they judge not for man but for God, and therefore the heart that does
most entirely fear God and love justice is under the greatest and most solicitous
care lest he should injure the God he fears, as well as man whom he loves, by any
oversight or mistake in his act of judicature.... And certainly if an invincible
mistake be so full of trouble to an honest mind, how much ought a man to be
incomparably solicitous that he do not either willfully or by any gross neglect
pervert that judgment wherein he does or should act as almighty God's substitute
and... consequently should, with all imaginable care and industry, endeavor that
his judgment be conformable to the justice of him whose person he sustains in
that office so that he may reasonably persuade himself that his judgment and
sentence is such as would be approved by the God of righteousness, wisdom, and
justice.
Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
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power, wary of its potential for evil, that suspicion has different
implications for the conduct of politics. Public international law,
and liberal political thought generally, has looked to institutional
mediation to neuter the potential of political power to realize the
evil will. 121 Islamic law, in contrast, itself mediates between the
particular and the general and so pays scant attention to mediating
structures. "The Qur'an although it is the eternal Word of God,
was, nevertheless, immediately addressing a given society with a
specific social structure."1 22 Islam thus holds both a universal
message and particular resolutions of problems; the various ahadith
contain not only general moral prescriptions but also specific tech-
nical resolutions. By drawing both universal and particular signifi-
cance from the shari'a, the Islamic legal imagination overlooks the
mediating levels of societal life, and not inconsequentially, political
thought.
Because Islam is the universal that matters, and the believer with
the book is the site of meaning, the status of social life as distinct
from belief is uncertain within Islam. This uncertainty extends to
the nation itself-
The nation-state... has never been definitively reconciled
with Islamic theory, which in its traditional formulation
recognized only the umma, or community of believers.
There have been Muslims who, despite the entrenched
character of the system of nation-states in the modern
world, still adhered to the traditional opinion that any
political subdivisions of the Islamic umma were inimical
to Islam. Others have accepted these divisions or toler-
ated them on the assumption that they are a temporary
phenomenon. 
123
121. Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, runs Lord Acton's famous
aphorism. The liberal response is institutional entanglement: the rule of law, including
pacta sunt servanda, federalism, separation of powers, and so forth. An interesting question
is the extent to which the turn toward institutions in the West is based on the Western
experience with the church, and the Islamic reluctance to engage in institutional discourse
is based on the Islamic experience of God unmediated by a church.
122. An-Na'im, supra note 79, at 65 (quoting Fazlur Rahman, Islam 232 (1979)).
123. Mayer, supra note 17, at 212. See also the 1985 Muslim Institute Conference's
statement that
modern nationalism is a peculiar product of western political development and
has been introduced to the lands and people of Islam through colonialism....
[T]he major goal of the ummah in the next phase of history is to abolish and
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The legitimacy of institutionalized power is thus profoundly com-
promised within Islam:
The state itself exists only to uphold God's sovereignty.
No other claim to domination is legitimate. To determine
right and wrong, to adjudicate, to rule, according to other
than the law of God, is unbelief.
[Flor they who do not judge... in accordance
with what God has bestowed from on high are,
indeed, deniers of the truth... ! [5:44]
To turn from the law in asserting authority over one's
equals is to follow mere hawa, or arbitrary, willful pas-
sion, caprice or whim, and thus to practice injustice,
oppression and wrongdoing toward one's fellow man (all
included in the concept of zulm, the doer thereof called
zalim):
(And We said:) "0 David! Behold, We have
made thee a (prophet and, thus, Our) viceregent
on earth: judge, then, between men with justice,
and do not follow vain desire..., lest it lead
thee astray from the path of God.... [38:26]
And they who do not judge in accordance
with what God has revealed-they, they are the
evildoers [zalim]! [5:45]
But nay-they who are bent on evildoing
[zulm] follow but their own desires [ahwa" pl. of
hawa] without having any knowledge (of the
truth).... [30:29]
Thus all forms of authority and submission-whether
moral or legal, whether those of individual conscience, of
mutual exhortation, of community solidarity and opinion,
or of secular command and sovereignty-must derive
dismantle the nation-states that now govern the Muslim areas of the world and to
create a unified dar al-Islam.
1985 Muslim Institute Conference, quoted in Tamara Sonn, Irregular Warfare and Terror-
ism: Asking the Right Questions, in Cross, Crescent, and Sword 129, 139 (James T. John-
son & John Kelsay eds. 1990).
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from ultimate truth, righteousness and justice. 124
In contrast, public international law is compromised from the
outset, and cannot plausibly claim to derive from righteousness. In
the view of the West, were righteousness available, international
law would be unnecessary. It is only because the international
environment is characterized as the state of nature that states seek
to order politics through treaties, through the webs of their own
consent. States consent because it is in their own self-interest to do
so. Law is thus derived from evil, the human proclivity to violent
self-interest, rather than from righteousness.' 25
As internationalists, the scholars surveyed here regard the
nation-state as a permanent facet of social life.' 26 In company with
124. Vogel, supra note 6, at 60-61 (citations omitted). Vogel has a polemical adversary,
the traditional claim that the justice dispensed by Islamic judges-qadi-justice in Weber's
phrase-is essentially unfettered, and the related belief that Islamic government is Oriental
despotism. Vogel argues that the law of the professional scholars of shari'a, the 'uiama';
constrains the justice meted out in the institutions, usually by qadi who are also alim,
members of the 'ulama" But the "ulama' possess no obvious temporal power; indeed, they
are dependent on the state. Finding no institutional checks on the power of the state,
Orientalists long ago concluded that Islamic governance was inherently despotic. Vogel's
claim is that, in a religious society, the checks on governmental excess may be religious.
The 'ulama' were often able to constrain the state because they, and not the state, were
(and are, in places like Saudi Arabia where shari'a law is still applied directly) the sole
arbiters of legitimacy. The state and its policies may be necessary, but they do not partake
of the higher orders of justification afforded by the shari'a. Throughout most of history,
the state required the legitimation conferred by the 'ulama', and the 'ulama' were able to
oppose and to some extent limit the exercise of power by the state by withholding, or
threatening to withhold, legitimacy. While the 'ulama' were thus able to secure their own
social position, and perhaps restrain what else would have been despotic power, this
arrangement had an unfortunate aspect: the exercise of power was bereft of authority,
suspect in the eyes of the governed. The illegitimacy of the state-at least for the 'ulama'-
had to be emphasized. The dubious quality of Islamic governance left Muslim countries ill-
equipped to cope with the vicissitudes of modernity. Vogel hopes for a relegitimation of
governance that draws on the tradition of siyasa. He disperses this argument throughout
his text, but states most of it in small compass. Id. at 122.
125. This is of course a gross simplification. Public international law has always had a
strong element of natural law and a sense of cultural superiority epitomized in the phrase
"the practice of civilized nations." Both may be associated with righteousness; but neither
captures the direct, participatory element of righteousness. Moreover, as important as
natural law and cultural superiority have been and are to public international law, I think
the primary creation myth of international law is and has been Hobbesian.
126. Bedjaoui suggests a more interesting relationship between the discourses when he
speaks of a law of nations as opposed to a law of community:
Up to now, peoples who have won their freedom have sought to exercise their
right of self-determination by endowing themselves with a state corresponding on
paper to the standards of the twentieth century. The decolonization process has
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those who believe in the nation's impermanence, however, not one
of these authors evidences the slightest interest in nations. But it is
nations, or more generally institutions, that speak international
law. Without attending to institutions, one cannot hear interna-
tional law. Institutions must be legitimated to hold an authorita-
tive discourse (and legal discourse must by definition be
authoritative), but under current Islamic belief, institutions are not
legitimate. Where they are not expressly illegal, they are ignored,
or at best, necessary (maslaha). With no Islamic authority vested
in institutions, there is no way for Muslims to structure the dis-
course of international law. Without speakers, the vocabulary that
details their inter-state relationships-the substance of interna-
tional law--cannot develop. International Islamic law scholarship
is thus left to explain subjects defined in and presented by public
international law, to accept the categories of the West.1 27 The dis-
course is informed by categories located outside any specifically
Islamic experiences, and is therefore suspect.
Although he is not explicit, Khadduri seems to suggest that
Muslims simply accept certain elements of public international law
as authoritative, such as the existence and legitimacy of the state,
and devote their attention to other, more obviously Islamic, con-
cers. Examination of these concerns reminds us of and illumines
the failings of public international law, but Khadduri's concessions
do nothing to provide public international law with Islamic legiti-
macy. The vocabulary for the discourse of international law, a dis-
course dependent on authoritative institutional utterances, does not
exist within Islam, which locates authority elsewhere. My earlier
conclusion, that there is no Islamic international law, is not a his-
thus flowed into this familiar mould of the state, in accordance with a sort of
'universality principle' applied to the contemporary organization of state power,
when in fact the state is a 'historic product' of an entire civilization and the
Muslim States had been organized in accordance with the model of a community.
And so the state as we know it has been the form assumed by all the successful
examples of national liberation. But was that the only form? Was there no other
way in which self-determination could be realized at the institutional level? I
cannot say.
Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 296. Bedjaoui thus poses, but does not answer, a question that
an Islamic international law would have to pursue in order to respond to the concerns of
public international law.
127. Or, from within the resources of the siyar, to discuss questions of conduct during
warfare, an institution transformed nearly beyond recognition by the introduction of
Western technology.
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torical accident, but rather a result of the inability to phrase the
institutional concerns of international law within the current lexi-
con of shari'a.
The inability of each discourse to articulate concerns of supreme
importance to the other is not the result of conceptual lacunae in
either one, but instead reflects deep differences in the way the dis-
courses themselves are structured. Islamic law, and hence Islamic
international law, simply holds a different conception of law than
does Western law, and hence public international law.128 In the
West, law is a general and abstract body, a corpus, in which each
part relates to the whole and to every other part of the law. The
law is separate both from the facts, the individual circumstances of
the social order, and from the transcendent purposes of the social
order, which I will collectively call justice. Judgment consists in
applying law to facts, in using the structure of the law to organize
somewhat unruly social phenomena. This process of subsuming
the particular under the general will, we Western lawyers hope,
contribute to bringing about a more just social order. Law is thus
both different from, and related to, the most lofty and the most
mundane of our social concerns.
Professor Vogel contrasts this idea of law, which he calls rule-
law, with the Islamic ideal of law, which he calls instance-law:
[The Islamic conception of law] is epitomized, not in sys-
tems of objective, formal, general, public, compulsory
rules, but in a unique decision of individual conscience
issued in evaluation of a concrete act.
The idea of law inhering in a unique event is conceiva-
ble if the lawgiver is God, since, conceivably, true unique
judgments for all events reside "with God" .... But to
man, in contrast, God's law is revealed only in revealed
128. At certain points, Western law has shared more with the conceptual structure of
Islamic law than does contemporary public international law. Ideas of natural law, for
instance, may be closer to shari'a than more positivist notions of law. See J.N.D.
Anderson, Islamic Law in the Modem World 8 (1959). Conscience and equity, which have
in different times and in different ways been important to Western jurists, are also vital
concerns of Muslim jurists. Comparing the Islamic legal tradition with the Western legal
tradition is a complex matter; both similarities and differences abound. For the sake of
simplicity and proximity to my argument, I simplified the comparative problem by focusing
on conceptions of law held in public international law. In the ensuing passage, my use of




texts, to be augmented by his own powers of reasoning
and perception; man's fiqh must make shift with language
and processes of reasoning, and therefore also abstract
meanings of words and general categories of thought.
Yet, as shown by the way the aspirations to meta-order-
ing and to pan-ordering together define its legal world,
fiqh did not relent from understanding that the shari'a-
any less than the perfect divine will itself-minutely, uni-
versally, evaluates all events. Ijtihad is precisely the effort
to attain this knowledge: to draw near God's true evalua-
tion for each particular event by applying usul al-fiqh to
concrete reality. God's shari'a may be unknowable in
either its infinity or its certainty, but it is not for all that
either metaphysical, inscrutable, or relativistic. 29
One might object that Islamic law is, in fact, rule-like: Islamic
judges reach predictable decisions; Islamic jurisprudence discusses
general issues; Islamic law is, after all, the law (in a Western sense).
Islamic law applies to all, it strains to achieve regularity,13 0 and it
aspires to justice.'31 This objection misunderstands the nature of
the characterization of Islamic law as instance-law. Instance-law
describes the self-image, the conscious ideal, of law, not the actual
practice of law itself. Conversely, Western systems of law are sur-
129. Vogel, supra note 6, at 233-34 (citations omitted).
130. A more technical objection is that the sciences of usul al fiqh, particularly the
doctrine of taqlid, have in fact sought to create a closed structure of rules, under which, in
Western fashion, particular phenomena must be subsumed. Vogel's, and hence my,
conceptual reliance on Ibn Taymiyya, a radical reformer and a Hanbali, who, though
certainly orthodox, is hardly mainstream, has lead to an excessive focus on the role of the
individual, and uncharacteristic exaggeration of the role of conscience, and therefore a
diminution of the importance of rules. In fine, Islam has an orthodoxy, and an orthodoxy,
by definition, is a system of rules. While powerful, I do not think this objection sustainable.
First, taqtid is necessary but hardly justified. "[Sichool taqlid . . . [was] by its own
admission ... a falling off from the high standards of the fiqh's origins, justified only by
necessity." Id. at 238. Second, taqlid is an addition to Islamic law, a recognition of the
need for rules, but it is not a source of authority per se. To draw an analogy, many Western
practices could hardly be justified in terms of our rule-like conceptions ofjustice, but while
we consciously recognize that law without such practices is unimaginable, we still define
law in terms of rules. Finally, taqild applies only to rule #ihad, which hardly comprises all
of judgment. Fact Ujtihad, which is still considered law, is outside the scope of taqild.
131. My hypothetical interlocutor does not take the all-too-frequent attitude toward
Islamic law, epitomized by Weber's phrase "qadijustice," that Islamic law is no more than
the will of the judge, made palatable by divine sanction. See Bryan S. Turner, Weber and
Islam 109 (1974).
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rounded by particular instances without which the law could not
function, but which one is loath to characterize as "legal." If one
examined an actual conflict in a Western legal system, from the
opening salvoes fired by lawyers, through the costs and aggravation
associated with discovery and pre-trial procedure, through the dis-
cretion of the judge and the findings of fact by the jury, or the pro-
cess of settlement, one would find very little "law" in the ideal
sense in which we conceptualize law.132 Myriad aspects of Western
legal systems are not ruled, and yet we generally describe our law in
terms of rules. In converse fashion, Islamic law contains regulari-
ties which might be phrased in terms of rules. But they are more
often imagined as instances.
13 3
One might also object that Muslims have rule-law, but that its
order is found at a higher level than in Western systems, at the level
of divine will rather than doctrinal consistency. The order of Mus-
lim law makes itself clear not when one considers the relationship
of one judgment to another, or of one rationale to the next, but
when one considers the whole. Muslim law may thus be imagined
as an image of Islamic art, built up of myriad, minute geometric
forms, and comprehensible from a distance. A pointillist painting
provides an explicitly Western image. 134 Upon examination, this
objection to the claim that Islamic law is instance-law reveals itself
132. Other examples of this are easy enough to find. In criminal law, think of
prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining, sentencing, and probation. In social life
generally, think of "legal advice" given between friends, or personal actions taken with
regard to the ends held forth by law. Think also of the activity in the environment
inhabited by international law.
133. Vogel summarizes:
Together these observations suggest that, in both legal systems, the two forms of
law may exist, each performing characteristic functions, without this being fully
acknowledged in either's ideal legal theory; each system may cherish a special
blindness for the alternative to its favored type of law. Exploring how in either
system-for us here the Islamic-both forms of law are used and interact will
shed light on what unites and what separates the Western and the Islamic legal
systems; it may also instruct us on the nature of instance-law and rule-law,
including the issues whether, when considered across the two legal systems, each
of the two types operates in characteristic ways on legal behavior, or fulfills
certain essential tasks.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 243.
134. A more technical version of this objection would be that the enormous effort of
medieval Islamic learning was the construction of a body of learning, an interconnected
web of doctrine. Here again translation is misleading. The medieval enterprise, in the
West, was the creation of a corpus; the medieval enterprise in Islam was the distillation of a
science of decision.
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to be an explanation. Instance-law does not mean that the legal
universe is chaotic. As suggested by the pointillist painting, the
universe is ordered in the mind of God, and that order is percepti-
ble by the mind of the jurist.
The order in instance-law, however, is different from the order of
rule-law perceived by the Western jurist, who understands legal
problems in terms of abstract doctrinal relationships among
abstractly conceived parts. In rule-law, the categories that order
social phenomena are imagined to order themselves, in turn,
through mechanisms called doctrine. Not Albania and Bulgaria,
but A and B have a treaty. Although disagreements about doctrine
exist, rule-law attempts to judge like cases alike, to be a standard, a
rule. So the doctrines that apply to Albania and Bulgaria also
apply to Yemen and Zimbabwe. The establishment of this order
requires the characterization of facts within legal categories, and
the treatment of these categories as legal entities. Here, all three
webs of people, land, and governance are regarded simply as states.
Doctrine may be understood as the way these abstract legal entities
are manipulated and organized. To use mathematical imagery,
legal entities are to the elements of a set what doctrine is to the
operations. If Islamic art is the token of instance-law, a matrix is
the token of rule-law.
135
Rule-law, the matrix, has a closed quality. Western law aspires
to be coherent, a closed system. The ultimate jurisprudential
expression of this desire for closure, for coherence-an expression
that for many served to reveal the limitations of the aspiration-is
Kelsen's positivism. Western law is a language that mediates
between abstract purposes, justice, and particular facts, but law
itself is neither the impulse nor the object of speech. In contrast,
instance-law does not communicate, but is itself the figure of jus-
tice. Islamic law is open where rule-law is closed; Islamic law
reaches upwards towards and including God, and downwards
towards and including the particular facts of each decision.
Instance-law stretches seamlessly from God to the facts.
The nature of instance-law is made more concrete by Islamic
ideas of judgment:
[C]ourt judgments are seen as momentary, atomistic
135. The abstract character of Western law and indeed political thought may be what
'AbuSulayman was trying to articulate under the heading of the systematization offiqh.
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events, with no precedential effect, even for the judge who
issued them. . . . 'Umar, in his instructions to his qadi,
says,
Do not let a judgment ... that you judged
yesterday and then reconsidered, and that you
were guided to a wiser opinion about, prevent
you from returning to the truth, for verily truth
is not voided by anything ....
Thus, 'Umar is reported to say, "I adjudged in the matter
of the grandfather [a much vexed issue of inheritance law]
various judgments... , in each of which I did not desist
from [seeking] the better." A persistent striving for truth
should not be inhibited by any secondary considerations,
here consistency with one's own, or another's, past hold-
ings .... Necessity compelling the determination of the
indeterminate, God has ordained judging. The judgment
is not thereby made religiously true; it may still be in
God's eyes a wrong ijtihad; but it is the religious justifica-
tion for compelling, and performing, action in the
zahir.
136
Instance-law is profoundly problematic for the creation of inter-
national law for two reasons: the relationship between law and his-
136. Vogel, supra note 6, at 220-21 (citations omitted). Vogel discusses instance-law
finding in the Saudi court, a digression perhaps illuminating for present purposes:
This is an apt point to digress to build on our instance-law, rule-law distinction in
order to give a name, "microcosmic interpretation," to the ideal that we find here
pushing adjudication toward instance-law forms. This ideal is that the qadi
strive, by penetrating to the concrete reality of the case before him, and then
appraising that reality holding it against the divine command of revealed texts, to
attain to God's true, transcendent law for that concrete case. "Microcosmic
interpretation," then, is an instance-law finding drawn from the transcendental,
or it is the finding, in the substratum of an individual conscience, of the true,
unique law for the concrete event. We use the term "microcosmic" to suggest the
monadic lawmaking sought; to capture how a unique act of individual conscience
fuses the concrete event and the revealed law together into a ruling somehow all
at once concrete and abstract, secular and transcendent, inner and outer, batin
and zahir, individual and universal. We use the term "interpretation" to remind
us of the vital fact that, despite the central function of conscience, the divine law
derives, not from sources within the mind or from some sort of immanent
intuition or inspiration, but from material textual sources approached through
the science of usul al-fiqh.
Id. at 332-33 (citation omitted).
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tory, and the relationship between instance-law and legislation. As
the foregoing passage indicates, no instance-law finding of the law
is religiously true; the law is constantly reviewable. Each judge
must strive to apply the law. Law does not progress, but is rather
eternally the same.1 37 The legal tradition, considered as a tradition,
is not authoritative.1 38 The mere fact of Islamic law's ongoing
quality lends it no special authority. Each occasion for judgment is
a new instance of shari'a, a fresh chance to realize the will of God,
or, conversely, to fall into error. The Islamic legal tradition, there-
fore, does not conceive of itself as building on itself, as organic.
The passage of time is not the context of legal development, but
rather poses the risk of forgetfulness, the danger of losing sight of
the true meaning of shari'a. So although the scholars surveyed here
are obsessed with locating authority in history, with the derivation
of law from the time of the Prophet, history as such-the change
and development of affairs-is antithetical to legal authority. The
open-ended search for truth informs the practice of Islamic law.
Public international law, in contrast, is largely constructed
through processes of political calcification. Legal obligation grows
over time. Courts publish opinions, refer to prior cases, and so
forth, so that even where there is no formal doctrine of precedent,
an expanding body of case law develops. Theories become the
desiderata for judgments and non-binding statements of law. Simi-
larly, practice becomes custom, is perceived as binding, and
becomes law. An issue becomes a concern, a bureaucracy is estab-
lished, a struggle over competence and legitimacy ensues, and over
time, a monopoly of authority is gained. The rule of public interna-
tional law is not the rule of truth but rather of habit (and hence
perhaps cultural truth). Habit, legal obligation, accretes. Where
Islamic law struggles against the ossification of habit and strives to
return to divine authority, public international law self-consciously
builds on the authority of continuity.1 39
137. See Anderson, supra note 128, at 3 ("But Islamic law (and to a lesser extent many
other legal systems of the Orient) is essentially different, for it is regarded fundamentally as
divine law-and, as such, as basically immutable.").
138. The Quran says, "And when it is said to them: 'Come towards what God has sent
down and towards the messenger,' They say: 'Sufficient unto us is what we have found our
fathers acting upon.' But what about it, if their forefathers knew nothing and were not
guided?" [5:104].
139. Public international law does so without a formal doctrine of precedent. See, e.g.,
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 59. Perusal of any International Court of
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The nature of Islamic law creates another disjuncture with public
international law: instance-law precludes the intentional creation of
international law. Many people-for want of a better name I will
call them internationalists-have self-consciously worked to create
public international law, to establish a fabric of legal obligation that
would bind states, and, more generally, would inform the global
polity. These efforts are inconceivable without the constitutional
faith, that is, without believing that some degree of happiness can
be achieved through appropriate political structures, and that polit-
ical structures can be consciously constructed. To have such a
faith, one must also conceive of law as something on which a polity
can build. Counterintuitively, political construction requires that
law be abstract, not concrete. Law must apply across time and
space, must separate itself from the individual conscience and the
ad hoc tailoring of justice to particular facts.
This objection may be clarified by trying to imagine the creation
of an international instance-law. An international instance-law
could be no more than a collection of just happenings and decisions
in international affairs. In the case of disagreement, how could one
define just? How could one create, or extend, such a law? Each
moment of legal utterance would simply replicate the previous and
anticipate the next occasion when justice was demanded. Under
instance-law, the would-be internationalist could only hope that
her successor was good; she could not hope that his problem would
be any more legal than hers, that his world would be more ordered
because of her work, that, in short, she was legislating a better
tomorrow. 140 The problem of justice is always the same; law does
not progress. The belief in a pure instance-law and the belief in
constitutionalism are thus incompatible.' 4 1 Again, public interna-
Justice opinion, however, reveals the attention the ICJ pays to prior decisions. More
generally, even though the myth of consent may seem a somewhat ahistorical location for
authority--each state may consent to some or all of the law anew-prior consent is
authoritative until changed. Through the doctrine of implied consent, which holds that a
state's consent may be assumed absent a protest, prior consent converges on custom, and
custom is the legislative function of history.
140. She may be able to hope that she can serve as a good example to her successors.
This possibility raises the issue of the transmission of Islamic political virtue, a
philosophical question on which I cannot speak.
141. Needless to say, there is no such thing as a pure instance-law, a law which
establishes no rules, and exists only in the present. Conversely, a pure rule-law is hard to
imagine, except perhaps as a logical game. But constitutionalism, in its American sense,
[Vol. 33:819
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tional law is a constitutional enterprise, an endeavor to create and
order a world polity. As participants in this endeavor, we believe
that law is something on which we can build; we hope to have heirs
rather than merely successors.
Not surprisingly, these vital differences about the nature of law
are reflected in equally essential differences in the way it is spoken,
in the way power is believed to be legitimate. At least as a matter
of logical coherence, pacta sunt servanda resolves the core problem
of public international law: the establishment of authority without
community, without a shared notion of good, shared experiences,
or shared interests. International law poses and answers, in short
compass, the central problem of political philosophy since Hobbes:
the organization of a polity without the assumption of a common
ethos. How is law possible among immoral men, or as the question
has been asked from Grotius to Kissinger, among nations which act
in their own interests? Pacta sunt servanda resolves this question
for public international law.
There have been numerous attempts to argue thatpacta sunt ser-
vanda is also a doctrine of Islamic law.'42 Most of these attempts
draw an analogy between treaty and contract, and argue that since
the shari'a clearly supports the keeping of contracts, it also sup-
ports the keeping of treaties. But presumably none of those who
argue that Islam also maintains pacta sunt servanda would go so far
as to argue that consent is the source of authority for Islamic law.
Islamic law draws its legitimacy from God, not from agreement. 14 3
the desire to create a polity on the basis of law, presumes that the law is something which is
both durable and artificial.
142. See, e.g., Moinuddin, supra note 42, at 48. Revisionist historical analysis can be
deployed to explain away the express prohibitions on treaties lasting over ten years.
143. Similar arguments are made in the context of debates over the Islamic character of
democracy. In his book, Radical Islam, Emmanuel Sivan notes that certain
fundamentalists have argued that democracy and Islam are essentially antithetical. For
example, Sa'id Hawwa has argued that:
Democracy is a Greek term which signifies sovereignty of the people, the people
being the source of legitimacy; it is the people who legislate and rule. As for the
shura, it denotes consultation [by the ruler] with a person or persons with regard
to the interpretation of a certain point of Islamic law. In Islam, the people do not
govern themselves by laws they make on their own, as in a democracy; rather the
people are "governed by a regime and a set of laws imposed by God, which they
cannot change or modify in any case."
Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam 74 (1985) (discussing Sa'id Hawwa). Sivan goes on to
discuss another fundamentalist:
Dannawi summed it all up in a lapidary formula: "The state in Islam obeys
1993]
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Therefore Islam cannot adduce consent, as does public interna-
tional law, as the justification for public order.
Legal authority is derived from God's utterances and his will as
revealed in the life of Islam. The believer finds authority within the
framework of the Islamic narrative, the cumulative account of the
revelation. The details of legal obligation incumbent on the
believer are the fruits of narrative exegesis of that account. The
believer is thus located within a narrative frame; conversely, that
narrative frame is common ground for all believers. 44 The most
important source of Islamic international law is the siyar, which
recounts events in the wars for the faith. The narrative history of
religious wars is legally authoritative today. Stated abstractly, it
seems odd that the reading of old war stories should produce legal
results. But perhaps the oddity is more pronounced for a contem-
porary Westerner, who, when thinking theoretically, tends to make
a sharp distinction between descriptive and normative speech. If
history serves as theology, or more generally, authority, then we
should not understand it as factual history, but rather as allegory.
Despite the emphasis that publicists of public international law
have placed on consent, a narrative attitude is hardly unknown in
Divine Law, not the people," which he explicates as a an emancipatory mecha-
nism--"liberating the state from subservience to human passions, whims and fan-
ies ... be they of the majority or the minority."
Id. (citation omitted). Yet another voice discussed by Sivan is that of Sayyid Qutb: "From
refusal to call Islam democratic, he [Qutb] moved in the 1950s to outright negation: democ-
racy is, as a form of government, already bankrupt in the West; why should it be imported
to the Middle East?" Id. at 73 (citation omitted). Democracy thus has no particular moral
authority; indeed, it is but another form ofjahiliyyah, ignorance of divine guidance. Need-
less to say, it would be misleading to present the view of Qutb or Hawwa as the Muslim
position; other Muslims see little or no insurmountable conflict between Islam and democ-
racy. See, e.g., Enayat, supra note 36, at 129 (asserting that Islam is compatible with
democracy). For a non-Muslim argument that Islam and democracy can coexist, see John
L. Esposito & James L. Piscatori, Democratization and Islam 45 Middle E. J. 427-40
(1991). Like most accounts of the situation by social scientists, the article fails to confront
the question of authority at the heart of the fundamentalist argument. Similarly, see Pis-
catori, supra note 41. At the very least, the fundamentalists convincingly demonstrate that
Islam and consent are different sources of authority, and hence each must be related to the
other. One might well argue that democracy does not work, that there cannot be a purely
consensual polity. While this may be true, my point is more modest: the liberalism that
informs both public international law and Western notions of democracy relies on consent
in ways different from Islam.
144. This is not to deny that the scope of technical lima is very restricted. Still, everyone
agrees that much that is not Uma is incumbent on the Muslim. The lack of Uma only
reveals failure to reach complete unanimity on a particular aspect.
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public international law. Custom is an ancient and still valid
source of law. Custom has often been treated as evidence of con-
sent, rather than as authoritative in its own right. Such treatments,
however, tend to reflect an a priori definition of law, i.e., that which
must be formed by consensual processes, and are therefore some-
what disingenuous. Similarly, within United States municipal law,
both precedent and constitutional exegesis vest the past with ongo-
ing legal significance. The legal quality of our history is frequently
(and highly problematically) associated with some sort of consent,
such as the Constitutional Convention or the existence of voting.
Upon examination, however, the actual situs of authority is impos-
sible to determine, and we credit a story, "the Founding," or less
obviously, "a fair election," with legal authority. International law
also tells its own narratives, chronicling the development of the
international legal order. 1 45
Although narrative is not completely foreign to public interna-
tional law, it is certainly not the primary source of legitimacy. The
narratives intended to be authoritative are stories in which consent
was given and governance was thereby empowered. A treaty was
signed, a law was passed, or an election was won. It is consent, not
the mere fact of history, that legitimizes politics, and there are limi-
tations to the ability of consent to legitimate international politics.
The borders of nation-states, for example, are usually taken as
given, without scrupulous examination of their origin. The point at
which civil unrest indicates that a regime no longer represents the
people it governs is similarly unclear. These and other examples
are recognized as problems in international legal theory precisely
because they are problematic for a theory of legitimation based on
consent.
There are good reasons why Islamic narrative cannot serve to
order international relations, cannot be the grammar of interna-
tional law. First, the history of Islam, to be compelling, must be
accepted as one's own. The legitimacy of shari'a rests on its exist-
ence as an expression of Islam. For the individual believer, Islam is
the religious/historical/mythical structure that informs the self.
For the infidel, however, this edifice offers no shelter. Since its
authority rests on individual belief, the structure of Islamic law is
145. See Kennedy, supra note 110, at 12-28.
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personal. 146 For the non-believer, Islamic law is merely an articula-
tion of an Islamic polity, and the sense of authenticity offered by
Islamic international law is unavailable. Islamic law thus fortifies
the converted, but only the converted. Without an (unlikely) wave
of mass conversion to Islam, it is difficult to see how Islam could
expand to form the basis of a new world order.
147
The second reason why Islamic narrative cannot serve as a foun-
dation for public international law is that Islamic traditionalists-
and in this the scholars surveyed here are traditionalists-look
backward to find authority, whereas public international law is
essentially a prospective enterprise. 148  For the Muslim, public
international law is radically incomplete. There has never existed a
time of the right-guided globe, a time when truth was available to
international politics. Public international law has always struc-
tured itself as an aspiration, a hope, or at best a plan, for the state
of nature to be replaced by the civilized interaction of states.
149
International law aspires to create, as opposed to rediscover, jus-
tice. Islamic international law and public international law recount
two antithetical narratives: the one tells of revealed truth aban-
doned, the other of Utopia regrettably postponed. None of the
reformers surveyed realize the forward-looking (legislative) nature
of public international law, and the backward-looking (adjudica-
tory) character of their own programs.' 50
Even the most advanced (to my eyes) of the writers surveyed
here, 'AbuSulayman and An-Na'im, do not provide an Islamic
account of the construction of international law. 'AbuSulayman
recognizes the demand for an Islamic vision of present and future
146. Liberal legal systems would seem to be equally personal, resting as they do on the
consent of the individual. Liberal ideology evades this issue through the notion of implied
consent. But implied belief, beyond the submission to the caliph by the dhimmis, seems
impossible.
147. Public international law must also require a minimal nexus of shared beliefs,
essentially in the ability to covenant. The beliefs are so minimal, however, that common
ground is often in fact reached among strikingly diverse groups.
148. A partial exception is An-Na'im, who attempts to locate present Islamic authority.
149. I cannot resist noting the aspirational parallels between this notion and the triumph
of the umma over the dar al-harb.
150. Adjudication can of course be used for legislative purposes. Indeed, a fecund
source of contemporary international law is dispute resolution through some sort of
adjudicatory proceeding, whether adjudication, arbitration, or structured negotiation. But
the legislative capability of such proceedings requires some mechanism by which
resolutions accrete, some notion of precedent.
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need. However, in attempting to liberate Islamic understanding
from what he views as the restrictive doctrines of the past, he
undercuts the authority of Islamic history. The delegitimation of
history is problematic because his primary approach to Islamic
authority remains exegesis. Although he is unable to rely on his-
tory as a source of law, 'AbuSulayman does nothing to legitimate,
Islamically, a prospective approach, to provide a way to make new
Islamic law. For his part, An-Na'im provides an alternative period
of history, so that the Meecan resources of the Islamic tradition
may be utilized. As with 'AbuSulayman, his mining of Islamic tra-
dition requires a certain delegitimation of the tradition, and, again
like 'AbuSulayman, An-Na'im remains tied to exegesis as the pri-
mary method of legal construction. While An-Na'im does insist on
contemporary life through Islam, modem questions that are not
fully answered by reference to Islamic texts are to be answered
politically, in non-Islamic terms, by a Western modernity."'5 At
best, both scholars provide a call for Islamic politics, but no Islamic
principle of legislation. For them, Islamic law, as law and as
opposed to politics, still looks backward, but their own works seek
to deny that the past can serve the present.
Third, the Islamic narrative, at least as traditionally understood,
cannot supply the justification required for both Islamic politics
and the construction of an international legal order. Islam reveals
the way, and if men would only comply, then true Islamic politics
would be assured. But for all its richness, Islam does not reveal
much of the way, and textual exegesis is difficult when ends are so
unclear. In particular, Islamic narrative pays little attention to the
issues of institutional structure essential to international law. In
Islam, when substantive detail cannot be found by the most crea-
tive fiqh, recourse is had to siyasa: the politics of administration
and legislation, the art of governance and rule, the methods of
guarding the umma. From the perspective of the 'ulama'" necessity
(maslaha) explains or excuses but does not affirmatively justify
siyasa.152  Politics inevitably compromises aspiration, and siyasa
151. An-Na'im, supra note 79, holds out the possibility that Islamic law will be defined
by an Islamic polity. However, he provides only the suggestion and no detail on how this is
to happen.
152. Insofar as it is founded on maslaha, siyasa is of highly limited authority, tainted by
its utility (literally), like the clothes of a Muslim corpse or the carrion flesh of a camel. The
"ulama'vision, in whichsiyasa, the authority of political institutions, is delegitimized, is not
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constructions, like all political designs, fall short. However, the
failures of siyasa are more devastating than political failures in
other cultures. Where the only justification is utility, there can be
no noble failures, no good faith efforts. Muslims often greet polit-
ical shortcomings with a vague and impassioned call for a more
Islamic politics, a return (or even revolution) to a more pristine
state, in which the fiqh suffices and the foreign questions which
require siyasa do not arise. Radical fundamentalism is compelling
because frustration, a sense of working in bad faith, is entailed in
Islamic political ideology.
Even for fundamentalists, politics is obdurately imperfect. But if
the politics of siyasa itself is tainted-a necessary evil to be avoided
whenever possible-political critique is an unlikely enterprise.
Fundamentalist political critique, or more precisely, fundamentalist
characterization of politics, oscillates between two modes: exhorta-
tion toward a more pure Islam, the long awaited establishment of
an Islamic state, and condemnation of the corruption responsible
for the failures, observed throughout all but the earliest history, to
achieve Islam. 53 Non-fundamentalists also tend to see siyasa as
necessary but not legitimated, as the best that can be hoped for an
evil world; non-fundamentalists who undertake siyasa often adopt a
certain self-loathing world weariness, in which good politics is a
pious hope. "Modernists" and "realists" who argue that siyasa is
insufficient for current conditions repeat the fundamentalist refrain
in muted tones. Unsurprisingly, both the supporters and the aboli-
tionists of siyasa find themselves frustrated. Short of achieving jus-
tice, or at least finding a scapegoat, their political theory allows
them little satisfaction and no practical criterion with which to
judge actual politics. As a result, sustained political critique, and
hence political reforms of any kind, are difficult. Islamic political
theory is thus ill-disposed to solve the problems of institutional
ambit and competence that comprise international law.
the only Islamic vision. The 'ulama' vision, however, is the dominant vision offqh, and,
hence, legal authority. The 'ulama' have captured the legal theoretical imagination; when
each of the scholars here writes, he writes with regard to the 'ulama' theory of law. This is
true, particularly of the more radical reformers, whose very radicalism is defined by their
distance from 'ulama' orthodoxy. Several of these writers mention the need for a larger
role for siyasa-the logical result of a more restrictive notion of fiqh such as that held by
An-Na'im-but none has made it the core of an Islamically authoritative program.
153. One might recall Marxist rhetoric, where the only explanation for failure was a
deviation from the way. This may be the price of total systems of political explanation.
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The grammar of Islamic law, the structure of its narrative mean-
ing, therefore seems inherently inadequate for the articulation of
public international law. To recapitulate: (1) Islamic law is only
authoritative for believers, and much of the globe does not believe;
(2) Islamic law draws authority from narrative exegesis, and inter-
national law requires a legislative rather than an adjucative
method, and (3) traditional understandings of the substance of the
Islamic narrative have bifurcated betweenfiqh and siyasa, and have
delegitimized siyasa. The discussion of grammar, the mechanism
of legal authority, has recapitulated the discussion of vocabulary,
the fundamental notions of what the law is. As interesting as
Islamic law is, its grammar and its vocabulary are too different
from their Western counterparts to be easily integrated into the
structure of public international law, which is founded on a West-
em legal imagination.
To summarize the argument of this entire section on the cogni-
tive differences between Islamic international law and public inter-
national law: Islamic law has no authoritative place for institutions,
particularly nations, and institutional authority is basic to public
international law. Islamic law has no constitutional myth, and
public international law is a constitutional enterprise. Islamic law
takes meaning from certain narratives, and those narratives are
inapposite to public international law. Islamic international law, in
the sense used by the scholars surveyed here, cannot speak to an
international environment composed of institutions, and so cannot
address the business of public international law.
The Islamic perspective does speak, however, to the core malaise
of public international law-a sense of meaninglessness and aliena-
tion, a certain lack of substance. Theology, the umma, and a narra-
tive of shared belief are such compelling possibilities for
international law because public international law is defined by a
notion of politics as exile. For both Grotius and Hobbes the state
of nature out of which law arises-the Western myth of legitima-
tion-is a world without community. The positivism that even in
decline dominates the identity of public international law, and the
realism that still structures much of our thinking about politics,
similarly eschew any form of solidarity, at least as regulative princi-
ples. For all its strengths, consent is the recourse of those who have
little else to bind them together. As moderns, we are lonely,
defined outside a community. Islam speaks to that loneliness. Per-
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haps Islam does not speak so persuasively that many of us on the
outside convert, but it does speak powerfully of our failure to
endow law with a sense of its own significance.
IV. POSSIBILInES FOR AN ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
So far, the argument of this Article as a whole runs as follows:
(1) Islam views public international law as a foreign entity, to
which a response is necessary; (2) Islam has not articulated an
international law; and (3) the failure to articulate an international
law is not accidental, or the result of a lack of vision, but results
from the structure of Islamic law, even as radically reformulated by
'AbuSulayman and An-Na'im. May we conclude that there can
never be an Islamic international law? If these conclusions are
true, are Muslims to comport themselves in the international arena
as if they were not Muslim? I think the answer to both these ques-
tions is no.
'AbuSulayman is right to argue that an Islamic international law
requires a re-creation of the methods with which Muslims think
about politics. Islamic political and legal method, however, needs
to do more than generate a sense of historical exigency, which may
be able to excuse, but can never justify, contemporary legal activity.
Excuse, necessity, or utility can never provide good politics, can
never legitimate Muslim participation in the regime of international
law. As long as utility, pure politics, is the only source of authority
for Muslim activities in public international law, then Muslim par-
ticipation on the international plane is at best another example of
cultural submission in a world structured by the foreigner-an
unhappy conclusion likely to breed unhappy politics.
By sacrificing law to politics, 'AbuSulayman takes the obvious
solution, the solution Christianity has taken in the West. For
'AbuSulayman, belief becomes an essentially private concern.
'AbuSulayman gives every appearance of being a pious man, and
while the substance and structure of his own thought are no doubt
Islamic, there is no reason to believe the social science he has gener-
ated will remain Islamic. 'AbuSulayman has freed Muslim politi-
cians from the constraints of Islam, and, at least arguendo, he has
provided them with a science. Unfortunately he has not located
this science within Islam. We presume that 'AbuSulayman's politi-
cians are believers, but the faith is not the root of their authority.
The project demanded of Islamic legal theorists, for whom belief
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cannot be private, is to develop a sacral vision of modernity. An-
Na'im powerfully confronts this task by struggling to speak
through Islamic authority. "It may seem like a contradiction in
terms to speak of achieving the benefits of secularism within a reli-
gious framework because secularism is, by definition, the relegation
of religion to the domain of private faith."-' An-Na'im establishes
the need for piety in politics, the sense that Islam is to be lived. He
does not, however, say how the diffuse faith of the community of
believers is to determine itself and issue law. An-Na'im argues that
Muslims must participate in international legal structures as Mus-
lims, but the substance of his discussions of that participation has
nothing Muslim about it other than the personnel. '55 Where is the
Muslim expression of human rights, self-determination, and the
other doctrines of international law on which he touches? By what
authority are such concepts Islamic?
Each of the scholars surveyed here perform a useful service: they
locate contemporary Islamic international legal discourse vis-i.-vis
the siyar. Significantly, each scholar provides a sense of the siyar's
inapplicability to contemporary problems and thereby serves to
undermine fiqh's monopoly of the legal imagination of Muslims.
Under any guise, fiqh cannot provide international legal authority.
Its content and structure are simply at odds with the structure of
international law; they are discourses with radically different con-
cerns. Fiqh and international law each speak of matters on which
the other is silent. Usul al-fiqh, and particularly the siyar, should
therefore be abandoned as a source of legal prescriptions in areas of
the international arena to which it does not speak. This does not
mean that siyar should have no legal effect: it should be studied as a
source of wisdom, and where it can be followed in good faith, it
should continue to form the basis of Islamic law.
Analysis of the last section may provide the outline of a prescrip-
tion. In order for Islamic law to confront the issues posed by inter-
national law, there must be a way within the discourse of Islam (1)
to discuss the legitimacy and authority of institutions, particularly
the nation; (2) to view law as a progressive enterprise, the construc-
tion of a polity; and (3) to see Islamic politics as morally legitimate
154. An-Na'im, supra note 79, at 10.
155. An-Na'im thus eventually makes the same move as the other reformers, but at a
more advanced stage in the discourse.
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and legally authoritative, even if it does not attain ultimate truth.
In short, Islam needs to develop a theory of political authority
before it can have a theory of international law. Fiqh does not have
the resources necessary for a theory of politics. Because law has
been more or less consciously identified with fiqh by all the publi-
cists of Islamic international law examined here, their theories of
international law either fail to encompass the international environ-
ment, fail to be substantively Islamic, or both. Within the concep-
tual complex offiqh, this failure is inevitable. Like Western notions
of law, and certainly public international law, fiqh is a limited dis-
course. Each discourse is limited in its own way; what can be said
in one may be inarticulable in the other. The task confronting
Islamic internationalists is to discover, within the resources of
Islam, legally authoritative ways of categorizing the actors and
articulating the concerns of the global polity. This requires Islamic
law to mean something more than it has throughout this discus-
sion, something Islamic but not fiqh.
Here I am overtaken by my ignorance of things Islamic. It is
time for me to stand aside. Insofar as Muslim scholars address
public international law, I feel a response is appropriate. I have
argued that their theories cannot be Islamic and at the same time
speak to the questions of public international law most broadly
defined. Now my argument has carried me to the substance of
their beliefs. For that, I presume no authority, but await an Islamic
voice.1
56
For the benefit of fellow non-Muslims, however, I note that the
Islamic tradition is rich, heavy with the possibility of political
authority. To merely name some examples: siyasa, or administra-
tion, can be understood as a noble enterprise, the attempt to realize
an Islamic entity. If Islam is in the past, as fiqh emphasizes, it is
also in the future, and the future has traditionally been the province
of siyasa. The honest effort of the individual, iftihad, can be a guide
to the true path. Ijma, the community of belief, offers legislative
156. Bedjaoui, for example, has written:
And I can restrain myself no longer from appealing to all jurists in the Muslim
world to take greater personal responsibility and mobilize more efficiently in a
decisive effort of creativity, instead of confining themselves to an attitude ofslavish
imitation which often results in strapping lifeless artificial limbs of foreign legal
origin on living human communities.
Bedjaoui, supra note 15, at 296 (emphasis in the original).
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possibility, particularly if it can be understood in terms less abso-
lute than has classically been the case.1 57  Similarly, the efforts of a
council of believers, shura, to decide on behalf of others, is an
essentially legislative conception.158 The question is whether or not
Islam can vest the activities of believers with moral and ultimately
legal legitimacy, so that Muslims feel their politics, including their
international politics, to be an effort in good faith and therefore
legally authoritative. 5 9 I see no reason why not, and I therefore
await an Islamic international law.
To the West, Islam seems to offer the possibility of discussing a
public notion of the good within a public notion of peace. Liber-
alism, in contrast, has declared notions of the good to be unavaila-
ble for public discourse, has bought order by sacrificing truth, and
has substituted process for substance. In consequence, liberal polit-
ical life hungers for that which it cannot have, a vision of its own
significance. As a liberal discourse, public international law settles
for peace. But peace, in and of itself, is only the context for frui-
tion. Human possibility demands more, something spoken to by
the Qur'an:
157. Vogel, supra note 6, at 108-10, cautions:
The Western mind finds the ijma' doctrine at first glance very appealing. The
doctrine seems to allow the Muslim community to make its own law, even after
the death of the Prophet, and thereby free Muslims from eternal servitude to a
fixed body of revelation. It would seem to provide a potentially all encompassing
method to render the divine law positive in two senses of the term: clearly
knowable, and susceptible to change. But, according to its theoretical
formulation, ijma' must disappoint such hopes.
First, no ijma' can deviate from, or have any force on, a matter already
determined in the Qur'an or sunna; and every ijma' ought to have a support in an
argument derived from these prior two sources....
Second, if one attempts to apply lima' strictly in conformity with theory, it
proves extremely elusive, indeed metaphysical: it could be held to fix with
certainty hardly any rule not already established by a text or age-old universal
practice (such as certain rules of prayer or pilgrimage)....
... [I]t is best initially to understand ijma' as not a primary but a secondary
source of law, a post-hoc support for views already strong.
But Muslims can speak of a consensus of a people for whom God cares, a people who will
not be allowed to go far wrong, even if they differ on details. Both the English and the Jews
have traditionally associated legal authority, history, and God in this fashion.
158. At the risk of sounding like Khadduri, do we do much else when we refer to "We
the people"? The quotation from Enayat, supra note 36, is a statement referring to shura,
not democracy.
159. In this vein, 'AbuSulayman argues that Muslims should see Ottoman governance as
an example of Islamic politics, and not merely the decadence of the Turks. 'AbuSulayman,
supra note 29, at 135.
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And hold fast, all together, unto the bond with God,
and do not draw apart from one another. And remember
the blessings which God has bestowed upon you; how,
when you were enemies, He brought your hearts together,
so that through His blessing you became brethren; and
[how, when] you were on the brink of a fiery abyss, He
saved you from it.
In this way God makes clear His messages unto you, so
that you might find guidance, and that there might grow
out of you a community [of people] who invite unto all
that is good, and enjoin the doing of what is right and
forbid the doing of what is wrong: and it is they, they who
shall attain to a happy state! [3:103-04]
V. AFTERWORD ON METHOD
A few words about some of the choices I made in writing this
Article may be helpful.
Beginning with the title and throughout the Article, "public
international law," is contrasted with "Islamic international law."
As a result of this choice, "public" exists in uneasy tension with
"Western international law," or perhaps a "Western view of inter-
national law." I have chosen "public" to stand in contradistinction
to "Islamic" for three reasons. First, although Western in its line-
age, public international law has entered global culture, and is no
longer a specifically Western enterprise. Second, public interna-
tional law conceives of itself as public and, more generally, as a
liberal political enterprise which values toleration, and conse-
quently avoids antagonism between cultures."6 Third, and most
importantly, many Muslims use "the West" to mean a cultural
framework which is antithetical to Islam. Considered as cultures,
"the West" and "Islam" are conceptually equivalent; they are
names for the spaces where meaning is found. The unavoidable
inference of Islamic versus Western international law is that the
two legal reginies are fundamentally equivalent, as apples and
oranges are both fruits. I maintain that this is wrong, and that the
Islamic scholars surveyed here, and the publicists of public interna-
tional law, are engaged in profoundly different pursuits. Hopefully
160. I make no claims about the extent to which liberalism is in fact tolerant.
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the incommensurate quality of "Islamic" and "public" will serve as
a reminder of this thought.' 61
The common use of "Western" among Muslim scholars has
merit. Certainly public international law imposes Western values
more often than it achieves neutrality. In such situations, "West-
ern" may well be appropriate. More generally, I use "Western" to
indicate those elements of our conceptual framework essential to an
understanding of our legal system, yet understood to be outside of
legal discourse. Moral or religious conception cannot be fit easily
within public international law, in large part because public inter-
national law defines itself as a discourse different from morality or
religion. In such instances, I have generally used "Western." Even
more difficult to phrase are conceptions that are not only assumed
by, but are central to, public international law, such as the nature
of legislation or of authority. These conceptions also draw on com-
mon Western understandings. In such cases, I have used either
"Western" or "public" in an ad hoc manner. (If nothing else, these
struggles with nomenclature serve to illustrate some interesting
ways in which public international law, and law in the West, have
been imagined.)
I spend little textual space developing, and no time defending,
the perspective on public international law from which I discuss
Islamic international law. Such an endeavor must await another
forum. More importantly, I have chosen to limit my focus to the
difficulties of Islamic international law. Consequently, I rely on the
reader's general familiarity with public international law. (Perhaps
this reveals that my argument is addressed, ultimately, to the
West.) I try to be sufficiently explicit about my perspective on pub-
lic international law, however, for the reader who knows little of
public international law to follow the argument.
Any discussion of Islamic law requires the use of several Arabic
words. Arabic words used in the text are defined, in somewhat dis-
cursive fashion, in a glossary appended to the text. I use the Arabic
because translation of words inevitably connotes the culture of the
language into which one translates, here the legal culture of the
United States. To say "shari'a" instead of "Islamic law" will hope-
fully remind the reader that the very concept of law is different in
161. My conclusion, however, calls for an Islamic international law which would be
directly comparable to public international law.
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the two cultures, and that a reader in one culture will have to sus-
pend beliefs and assumptions about law in order to understand the
other culture. The suspension of critical judgment, however, can-
not be complete. 162 The problems of Islamic articulations of inter-
national law cannot be understood without a critical grasp of the
issues. In contrast to most law review articles, which tend to be
written from a single perspective, the inquiry undertaken here
requires a shifting succession of perspectives. Wherever possible, I
have tried to be both inside and outside of an argument, to fathom
why it was made and to object. The sustained adoption of different
perspectives-critic and student, outsider and insider, reformer(s)
and orthodox, Islam and the West-renders this Article inconsis-
tent. But no consistent perspective could begin to make the range
of views in the discourse understandable. Rather than consistency,
I have striven after coherence.
I am an outsider to this discussion in two senses. I am neither
Muslim, nor am I what used to be called an Orientalist, a West-
erner who specializes in understanding the East. 163 My ignorance
of matters Islamic is no doubt apparent to those in a position to
judge. What knowledge of Islamic law I do have, however, I owe
largely to my friend and teacher Frank Vogel. Specifically, I owe
him my interpretive framework, and many of the deep or structural
characterizations of Islamic law on which my argument relies. To
be candid, this intellectual debt was acquired circumstantially:
Vogel taught me Islamic law while I was a student at Harvard,
where I read, and was profoundly influenced by, a draft of his doc-
toral dissertation. After I had left Harvard, however, and had
begun working on this Article, I found I could not supplant the
work of Professor Vogel with mainstream Western Islamic law
scholarship. The classics of Islamic law were of little use to me.
Islamic law scholarship has tended to be Orientalist. This tradi-
tion regards Islam as an object of study, a topic of scientific conver-
sation." In its modern guise, this tradition reaches back to Ignaz
162. Where I am critical, I tend to write Islamic law, to imply current understandings of
Islamic law, not the ultimate law that is shari'a. In so doing, I hope both to respect Muslim
sensitivities and to make my point.
163. Orientalist is usually capitalized. Perhaps polemically, I will also capitalize it here.
164. Jurisprudence in the West has also been hampered by attempts to see itself as a
descriptive/objective/scientific enterprise, an attitude Dworkin ridicules as the desire for
either a "plain fact" or a "semantic" theory of law, depending on the extent to which a
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Goldziher, a Hungarian Orientalist of deep and wide reading, who
wrote the highly influential Introduction to Islamic Theology and
Law.165 In it, he argued that Islam is the result of a historical pro-
cess, and spent the bulk of the book offering that historical process
as an explanation for the "facts" of Islam. Over half a century
later, this tradition was updated by Joseph Schacht's canonical (to
the English speaking world) Introduction to Islamic Law,'" and by
Coulson, in his explicitly historical A History of Islamic Law.' 67
The problem with Orientalism is that Islamic law is external to its
intellectual apparatus. Orientalism makes no attempt to participate
in Islamic law, but is content to describe Islamic law as if it were to
remain, despite great scholarship, utterly foreign to the reader. If
one has only a limited curiosity about other cultures, this perspec-
tive is unproblematic.
However, law is more fruitfully understood as a practice than as
a fact; law is an endeavor engaged in by fellow people rather than
aliens. Understanding a practice requires participation, if only the
virtual participation of the sympathetic intellectual who suspends
judgment and listens to another's argument. To understand law,
one must be given some sense of what it means to think like a law-
particular attempt to define law recognized law as a linguistic structure. See generally
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
165. Goldziher, supra note 91.
166. Schacht, supra note 7.
167. Coulson, supra note 9. There is another reason why the Orientalist tradition has
fallen on hard times. From the perspective of Orientalism, the Muslim countries were
engaged in an essentially linear, if perhaps only gradual, progress to Western secular
modernity. Orientalism was thus ill-equipped to handle the Islamic revival. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 128, at 96 ('There can be little doubt that the secularization of the
law ... is here to stay."); Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World (1976).
David Pearl concludes:
Writing in 1976, Sir Norman Anderson commented on the possibility of a revival
of orthodoxy and fervour, although he doubted whether this would be more than
a temporary phase, at least in so far as the law is concerned.... As in the first
edition of this book published in 1979, it is no part of the brief to speculate on the
future. But the changes in Pakistan discussed in the last few pages have brought
about a radical change in the legal framework for the Muslim community in that
country .... The debate however has really only just begun, and the conflicting
tensions apparent in the Muslim legal world will be resolved by the Muslim
communities themselves drawing upon their remarkable legal traditions and
history.
David Pearl, A Textbook on Muslim Personal Law 244-45 (2d. ed. 1987) (citations omit-
ted). My Article is informed by Pearl's doubt that the Orientalist method-his own
method-suffices to treat Islamic politics.
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yer. To understand Islamic law, one must be given some sense of
what it means to think like a Muslim practicing shari'a. The Orien-
talist tradition is unwilling to do this; it rests secure in its own
explanatory apparatus. This security can lead to substantive mis-
takes, often due to the Orientalist's refusal to recognize the pres-
ence of cultural elements underrated by their own political scheme.
So, for example, religion figures surprisingly seldom, and usually as
a mask for power politics, in the accounts of Islamic law offered by
Orientalists.
The adoption of a rigorously external view of law also creates a
false sense of precision. A quote from Schacht illustrates:
In Shafi'i, who considered himself a member of the school
of Medina although he made the essential thesis of the
Traditionalists prevail in Islamic law, legal reasoning
reached its zenith. Explicit legal reasoning, most of it of a
superior quality, occupies a much more prominent place
in Shafi'i's doctrine than in that of any of his
predecessors. 168
On a cursory reading, this makes sense. But on a closer reading,
the meaning dissolves altogether. Taking the first few clauses on
faith, as conclusory sentences which a great scholar is entitled to
make without support, what is the "zenith" of legal reasoning in
Islam? I am not making a skeptical argument that any judgment of
the quality of legal reasoning is nonsensical. I would be willing to
opine on the quality of legal reasoning in the context of, say, appel-
late jurisprudence in United States courts. But what does
Schacht--of Leyden and Oxford universities-mean? Are we to
assume that legal reasoning is the same thing for Dutch, British,
and Islamic law? How does legal reasoning relate to whatever else
is in Shafl'i's doctrine? Shafi'i apparently saw fit to displace the
material found in his predecessor's work (what was it? religion?
flattery to a patron? philosophy?) and replace it with "legal reason-
ing." Schacht implies that we can conclude that legal reasoning
was (and is) distinct from other activities that might be carried on
in legal writings. This seems odd, given that Islamic law is self-
consciously a sacred law. What is the relationship between legal
reasoning and religious belief in second century Islamic doctrine?
168. Schacht, supra note 7, at 45-46.
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Reading Schacht, I do not know, and I conclude that I have
learned almost nothing important about Islamic law.
Perhaps Schacht himself could answer these questions; he spent a
great deal of time reading Islamic law. In order to answer these
questions, however, he would have to adopt a position internal to
Islamic law, a position from which Islamic value judgments could
be made. Whether a given argument is hopelessly heterodox,
merely persuasive, or represents the zenith of Islamic legal reason-
ing is not a matter of objective fact, as the Orientalist view implies,
but a matter of an Islamic thinker's regard for the argument.
Schacht, and the Orientalist tradition in general, are unwilling to
write from an Islamic perspective. As a result of its external view
of Islam, the Orientalist tradition finds itself absolutely unable to
evaluate, indeed, to take seriously, Islamic arguments. Responding
to an argument requires that the argument be entertained on its
own terms, that is, requires the respondent to see himself in the
terms of the argument. Because it refuses to enter Islam even in the
imagination, and indeed regards such a move as illegitimate, as bad
science, and as subjective interference with the object of study, the
Orientalist tradition is conceptually incapable of responding to
Islamic legal arguments. Consequently, the Orientalist perspective
has been nearly useless to me in trying to respond seriously to
Islamic thinking on international law.
While giving a fair hearing to Islamic authors requires an inter-
nal perspective, an internal perspective on Islam is admittedly hard
to come by. Islamic culture is very different from mine, and, I pre-
sume, different from the culture of most readers of this Article.
Moreover, simple translation does not suffice to provide one with
the internal perspective. In order to hear and respond to Islamic
arguments one has to acquire (as opposed to just describe) some of
the belief structure of Islam. One has to learn how concepts hang
together. To my knowledge, Vogel's work is the only sustained
effort to make Islamic patterns of thought available to English-
speaking minds-hence my conceptual reliance on Vogel's book.
This Article attempted to consider two problems simultaneously.
First, I attempted to evaluate subjectively two legal regimes that
are usually presented objectively: public international law and
Islamic international law. Simultaneously, I tried to evaluate the
extent to which the languages of these legal regimes have similar
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and dissimilar concerns.' 69
I may have failed to capture what is essential about Islamic inter-
national law; consequently, I may have misstated the relationship
between the modes of discourse. Vogel's work is based largely on
his experience in Saudi Arabia observing the justice administered
by men of the Hanbali/Wahabi strand of the Sunni faith. It may be
that Vogel's explicitly limited characterizations of this doctrinally
circumscribed practice cannot serve to describe Islamic law gener-
ally, and therefore cannot serve as a guidepost in the study of
Islamic international law. Perhaps a different stream of Islamic life
would better inform my understanding, or better address the needs
of public international law. Perhaps a yet more pure application of
Islam by the Saudi judges, or deeper understanding on the part of
Vogel or myself, would clarify the difficulties of Islamic interna-
tional law.
I would certainly like to hear such arguments. However, my cri-
tique of contemporary Islamic international law is basic. I think
my characterizations of Islam are very general, much more general
than the differences among the schools, or among the authors I
survey. And if I nonetheless fail to grasp something essential, if my
understanding is faulty, I can only invite Muslim scholars to
explain themselves again in terms more cognizable in the West.
My argument does not rely on a sophisticated or a fine-grained
understanding of Islam. Therefore, unless I have missed something
absolutely basic, the numerous failings in my understanding are
unlikely to change my conclusions.
Despite my limited understanding, I make bold to write about
Islamic international law because of the political importance of a
vision of international law among Islamic societies, and because of
the claim made by Islamic international law that it speaks both to
Muslims and to citizens of the non-Muslim world. So, although
my appropriation of Islamic concepts is likely to be clumsy, and the
generalizations which I draw about both Islamic international law
169. Readers interested in the differences in participatory and objective understanding of
different cultures might find the discussion and bibliography in Stanley Tambiah, Magic,
Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality (1990), an illuminating place to start. It
should be apparent by this point that I find all law, not just Islamic law, to be a structure of
belief, a way of ordering the universe. Harold Berman, with whom I have studied, has




and public international law are more than a little graceless, I have
tried to outline the relationship between these two visions of world
order, and in so doing, to suggest paths that the adepts of each law




Batin: inward, hidden, deep, significant, both transcendent and
immanent.
Dar al-islam: territory of the Islamic state.
Dar al-harb: territory of the enemy, non-Muslims who have not
recognized Muslim suzerainty.
Dhimma: covenant, responsibility, situs of obligations and rights in
the individual. This word refers to the "protected" status of
Christians and Jews under the Islamic political order.
Dhimmis: non-Muslims protected by a treaty of surrender.
Fatwa: the judgment of a mufti. See also /fla.
Fiqh: the science/method of the divine law; the body of human
knowledge of divine law. Where shari'a considers law in light
of divine omnipotence, fiqh considers law in light of the
human aspiration to understand, fuilfill, and realize the shari'a.
Fiqh is a science; shari'a is the truth.
Hadith (pl. ahadith): a tradition, an account of an action or state-
ment of the Prophet, and technically, an authenticated text
within the Sunna. People of the hadith: school which focuses
on problems of authenticating hadith, and whose proponents
tend to argue that God's revelation, even when only probable,
is superior to human reason as a source of law.
Ifta: a giving of authoritative advice on shari'a; contrasted with
qada" which is a public arbitration of shari'a. The alim who
gives qada' is a qadi; the alim who provides ifia is a mufti.
ljma: adjudication under consensus, unanimity. Technically, the
unanimous agreement of all qualified legal scholars of an age
upon a legal rule. The third source of law in the classical
scheme.
170. This glossary is by no means complete, and the definitions given are not
compendious, but are written to make the text intelligible. For a more complete glossary of
Islamic legal terms, see Schacht, supra note 7, at 297-304; Vogel, supra note 6, Glossary
and Index of Arabic Terms.
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Ijtihad: literally, to strive, labor, exert effort. Technically, the
attempt to craft legal judgment in accordance with God's law
in cases where the law is uncertain. Ijtihad is a problem for
scholars and rulers as well as judges. Generally, the effort to
fulfill God's design. Used generally, itihad can be seen as a
task for all Muslims in areas of moral uncertainty. Seefihad.
Jahiliyyah: ignorance of divine guidance.
Jihad: literally, striving. Usually translated as holy war, crusade.
Masalih mursala: unrestricted utility, acts not enjoined or excluded
by revelation, and therefore presumed legal.
Maslaha: interest, utility, public interest.
Mujtahid: one with the qualifications-learning and piety-
required in order to find the law through itihad. Although
one must be pious to discern the law, one need not be
charismatic.
Naskh: abrogation or repeal of a prior revelation of Qur'an or
sunna by a later revelation.
Qada: the art of adjudication.
Qadi: Islamic judge.
Qiyas: analogy used in legal reasoning.




Siyar: Islamic law regarding the use of force.
Siyasa: policy, administration.
Siyasa shari'a: siyasa which is performed within the limits pre-
scribed by shari'a.
Sunna: literally, beaten path. The tradition of examples set by the
Prophet, and derivatively, by his closest companions. As the
Islamic world extended in time and space, the transmission of
the tradition shifted from the direct assimilation of example
(imitation), to the recounting of stories about the Prophet and
those near to him (verbalization), and ultimately, to the con-
struction of a body of authenticated texts (dogmatization).
Although not revealed, sunna is a divinely sanctioned source
of law: the Qur'an commands obedience to the Prophet; God
undertook to correct the Prophet's errors. In the classical
scheme, sunna was the second most authoritative source of
law.
[Vol. 33:819
1993] ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 897
Taqild: method of decision which relies upon another's authority,
as opposed to practicing itihad.
'Ulama' (sing. aiim): the learned. Usually used in the plural to
denote the class of religious scholars who, from the Abbasid
dynasty forward, and in return for cooperation with the state,
held exclusive control over all arbitration of shari'a rights.
Umma: the nation, usually Islamic nation.
Usul al-fiqh: roots or sources of fiqh.
Zahir: literally, obvious, apparent, evident. The opposite of batin.
Zalim: evildoers, in the sense of "unjust," the antonym being adil:
just.
Zuim: evildoing, injustice.

